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common, and an involuntary disability should surely have more.
effect, if anything, than a voluntary one.
It is probable, however, that when the question arises for decision, the court before which it comes will be less influenced by the
strict rules of law than by that deeply-rooted sentiment of the
English and American people, that the proper place for a wife is
her home among her children.
In those states where married women are authorized by statute
to carry on business and bind themselves by their contracts, they
may enter into partnerships: In re Einkead, 3 Biss. 0. 0. 405;
flaiqht v. He Veagh, 6 Chic. L. Ne'ws 151 ; .Newman v. Morris,
52. Miss. 402; Bitter v. Bathman, 61' N. Y. 512; Plumer v.
Lord, 7 Allen 481; Lord v. Parker, 3 Id. 127. And where
they have power to enter into partnerships after marriage, there
can be little doubt that the marriage of a female partner would not
dissolve the firm previously entered into, especially where it is
provided by statute that marriage shall not operate to transfer the
wife's property to her husband.
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HERMANN LOOG v. BEAN.
An injunction may be granted to restrain oral slanderous statements concerning
another's business, and in such case it is not necessary to show actual loss. This
jurisdiction, however, should be Zxercised with great caution.
B. was employed to manage one of L.'s branch offices for the sale of machines,
and resided on the premises. He was dismissed by L., and on leaving gave the
postmaster directions to forward to his private residence all letters addressed to him
at L.'s branch office. He admitted that among the letters so forwarded to him were
two which related to L.'s business, and that lie did not hand them to L. but returned
them to the senders. After his dismissal lie went about among the customers making
oral statements reflecting on the solvency of L., and advised some of them not to
pay L. for machines which had been supplied through himself.
L. brought an
action to restrain B. from making statements to the customers that L. was about to
stop payment or was in difficulties or insolvent, and from in any manner slandering
L. or injuring his reputation or business, and from giving notice to the post
office to forward to B.'s residence letters addressed to him at L.'s office, and
also asking that he might be ordered to withdraw the notice already given to
the post office. Held, that the injunction ought to be granted.
Held, also that the defendant had no right to give a notice to the post office, the
efthct of which would be to hand over to him letters of which it was probable that
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the greater part related only to L.'s business ; and that the ease was one in which a
mandatory injunction compelling the defendant to withdraw his notice could properly
he made, the plaintiff being put under an undertaking only to open the letters at
certain specified times, with liberty for the defendant to be present at the opening.

from interlocutory injunction.
The plaintiffs were a limited company styled Hermann Loog,
Limited, carrying- on the business of selling and letting sewing
machines. In 1882 the defendant entered their employment as
manager of their branch establishment in Portsea, at a salary of 21.
per week, the engagement being determinable by a week's notice.
The terms of the engagement were defined by an agreement in
writing dated the 13th of October 1882, which, inter alia, provided that "all letters and correspondence, though addressed to
the said E. C. Bean, unless referring to private affairs, shall be
deemed to be the property of the company, and may be opened by
any director thereof or any person authorized by the company to
do so, and possession thereof shall be taken by the company whenever desired by the officers." The defendant was to reside on the
company's premises, and accordingly did so, and conducted their
business there from the date of the agreement.
- The company dismissed the defendant on the 9th of January
1884, giving him a week's salary in lieu of notice, and on the 12th
of February they commenced the present action, asking for an
account of the defendant's transactions as their agent, and for
an injunction in nearly the same terms as their notice of motion
subsequently given, viz., that the defendant, his agents or servants
might be restrained from stating to the plaintiffs' customers, or
any other person or persons, that the plaintiffs were about to stop
payment, or were in difficulties or insolvent, or making any statement to the above or the like effect, and from in any manner slandering the plaintiffs or injuring their reputation or business; and
also from giving notice to any of the plaintiffs' customers not to
pay the plaintiffs any moneys due or owing to the plaintiffs in
respect of the hire of machines or otherwise, and from in any
manner intermeddling with the plaintiffs' customers or making use
of the knowledge or influence be acquired as the plaintiffs' agent,
so as to injure the plaintiffs or their business; and also from giving
notice to the post office or any other persons requiring the letters
addressed to the defendant at the plaintiffs' residence, or their
office used by him while he acted as the plaintiffs' agent, to be
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re-directed and sent to the defendant, and from in any manner
interfering with the plaintiffs' opening and taking possession of
such letters other than those relating to the defendant's private
affairs ; and for an order that the defendant should forthwith withdraw the notice which he had already given to the post office at
Portsea, requiring letters to be re-directed as above mentioned, and
deliver up to the plaintiffs all letters which had been so re-directed
other than those relating to the defendant's private affairs.
As regards the proceedings with the customers, who were chiefly
seamstresses or other working people, evidence was given by a
number of them showing that the defendant had made such statements as the following, viz.: to one, that the plaintiffs' firm was a
swindle, and that he could supply a better machine than the one
she had purchased from the plaintiffs ; to another, that she need
not pay the plaintiffs any of the money remaining due for a
machine, as it had been supplied by himself; to another, that he
need not pay for a machine till the defendant was settled with in
court; to another, that she need not pay the plaintiffs any more
money for a machine she had hired to another, that she had better
not pay the plaintiffs any more of the instalments on a machine
she had bought as they were bankrupt; to another, that a machine
she had bought, from the plaintiffs would only last three months
longer; to another, that he must not pay anybody but the defendant for a machine he had bought, as it was his property, and that
the defendant was going to stop all his customers from paying any
money till he got his account against the plaintiffs settled; and
several other cases of similar statements were deposed to.
As regarded the second branch of the case, it appeared that the
defendant, on leaving the plaintiffs' service, gave notice to the
post office at Portsea to forward to him, at his address in the adjoining district of Landport, all letters addressed to him at the company's place of business. The defendant stated by his affidavit
that, except in two cases, all the letters which had been re-directed
to him in pursuance of the notice, referred only to his private
affairs, and that he returned these two to the senders, saying that
he was no longbr connected with the plaintiffs. He alleged that
he was to some extent a partner with the plaintiffs, as he had
bought in certain stock for which he had not been paid, and that
an arrear of salary was due to him, but these statements were
denied by an affidavit of the plaintiffs' manager.
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A witness for the plaintiffs' deposed that she had, on the 2d of
January 1884, hired a machine from the defendant as manager of
the plaintiffs' business, and that on or about the 24th of January,
thinking that the defendant was still managing the business, she
called on him and asked him to take the machine away. That he
called with a man and took it away, and she paid him 78. for the
hire. No notice of this was given by the defendant to the plaintiffs till the 21st of February, when he called at their Portsea office
and tendered the machine with the 7s. This was admitted by
the defendant's affidavit. There was also evidence that the defendant had received letters with money inclosures, and had not for
some time handed the money to the plaintiffs.
On the 7th of March 1884, the plaintiffs moved for an injunction
as above, which was granted. Defendant appealed.
Oswald, for appellant.
.Yorthmore Lawrence, contra.
COTTON , L. J.-This is an appeal from an interlocutory injuncticn granted by Mr. Justice PEARsox against the defendant, who
had formerly been in the employ of the plaintiffs, and whose
engagement was put an end to in the beginning of January last.
The injunction went to two points: 1st. To restrain the defendafit
from "making certain libellous statements with reference to the
trade and business of the plaintiffs. The order has not yet been
drawn up; and, therefore, we do not know the exact terms of it,
but the endorsement of Mr. Northmore Lawrence's brief which has
been handed up to us, is, to restrain the defendant, his agents and
servants, from stating to the plaintiffs' customers, or to any other
person or persons, that the plaintiffs are about to stop payment, or
are in difficulties or.insolvent, or making any statements to the above
or the like effect, and from in any manner slandering the plaintiffs in their business, and also from giving notice to any of the
plaintiffs' *customers not to pay the plaintiffs any money due or
owing to the plaintiffs in respect to the hire of machines or otherwise. The registrar, who is in court, tells me that he thinks the
words "or any other person or persons" would not have been in
the order if it had been drawn up, because in the registrar's note
the only word is " customers." Nw with that qualification the
order, in my opinion, is clearly right, and it was only because we
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thought that Mr. Lawrence probably would insist upon the insertion of those words, "or any other person or persons," that we
asked him whether he objected to their being struck out. It
appears from the evidence that statements such as are prohibited
by the order were made by the defendant. Here is a man who
had been in the employ of the plaintiffs, making to their customers
slanderous statements with regard to the business of the company,
and trying to induce the customers not to pay the sums which
they owe to the plaintiffs. The court has of -late granted injunctions in cases of libel, and why should it not also do so in cases of
slander ? It is clear that slanderous statements, such as were
made to old customers in this case, must have a tendency materially
to injure the plaintiffs' business; they are slanders therefore,
spoken against their trade. It is not necessary, therefore, .in my
opinion, to show that loss has actually been incurred in consequence of them. If they are calculated to do injury to the trade
the plaintiffs may clearly come to the court. There is, no doubt,
more difficulty in granting an injunction as regards spoken words
than as regards written statements, because it is difficult to ascertain exactly what is said. But when the defendant is proved to
have made certain definite statements, such as are mentioned in
the order, in my opinion an injunction is properly granted to prevent his repeating them. The defendant (though no doubt the
tongue is an unruly member to govern) must take care that he
keeps his tongue in order, and does not allow it to repeat
those statements which he is by the injunction restricted from
uttering.
Then the second part of the injunction, which is in part manda
tory, restrains the defendant from giving instructions to the postmaster as to his letters, and orders him to withdraw a notice that
he has already given to the postmaster. Objection is taken to
that on the ground that it is a mandatory injunction, and that the
defendant had a right to give directions to the postmaster to send
his letters to his actual address. I need hardly say anything
about the mandatory injunction being granted. This court, when
it sees that a wrong is committed, has a right at once to put an
end to it, and has no hesitation in doing so by a mandatory injunction, if it is necessary for the purpose. Then as to the merits,
undoubtedly a man when he changes his address, has a right to
give directions to a postmaster to send on to him his letters, but
VOL. XXXII.-89

HER ANN LOOG v. BEAN.

that assumes that they are his letters, and what we find here is
that the defendant was formerly residing at the plaintiff's office as
a servant of the plaintiffs, and a very large proportion of the lettersaddressed to him were undoubtedly letters relating to the business
of the company, though, of course, there might be some letters
By means of his notice to the
which would be marked "private."
postmaster the defendant has got at least some letters which ought to
have been treated as the letters of the plaintiffs, and to have been
sent on to them. Instead of doing that'the defendant has opened
them, and not until some time afterwards has he given them to
the plaintiffs, or offered to them the money intended for them,
which was in the letters. There is also a case where money was
paid to the defendant for the hire of a sewing-machine of the
plaintiffs, and the machine was returned, and he did not for some
considerable time send the money or the sewing-machine to the
plaintiffs. The defendant having so acted, the case is, in my
opinion, one in which it is the duty of the court to interfere, and
to see that he does not, by reason of his having been employed in
the plaintiffs' house of business, obtain letters which are intended
for them, and really belong to them, but which have come, under
his direction given to the postmaster, to his own private residence.
Some of them, in consequence of their being forwarded to him at
his own house, have admittedly not gone as they ought to have
gone, to the address of those persons who bad been his employers.
I do not rely in any way on the terms of the agreement, because
that was an agreement which was to last during the engagement,
which engagement has now been put an end to, but we ought, in
my opinion, to interfere, and I think the proper order will be to
continue the injunction as regards the defendant's notice to the
post office, on the condition that the plaintiffs must undertake, in
addition to the undertaking they have already given, not to open
the letters which are addressed to him at their office, except at two
hours in the day-in the morning and afternoon-when the post
coiies in, and that the defendant shall have liberty, at those hours,
to attend there; and also that they must undertake to deliver to
him, instead of forwarding to him, any letters which relate to his
private business.
Then comes the question of costs. In my opinion the defendant
here has failed; and although we have slightly modified the order
as it comes before us, yet I think that ought not to prevent the
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appellant, who in substance has failed, from paying the costs of the
appeal.
BOWEN and FRY, L.L. J., delivered concurring opinions.
In 1860 Sir RICHUARD MALINS, V. C.,
made perpetual an injunctiun restraining
the publication of a notice which alleged
filsely that the complainant was a partner in a bankrupt business house; and
in the course of his opinion the learned
judge said : "In the decision I arrive at
I beg to be understood as laying down
that this court has jurisdiction to prevent
the publication of any letter, advertisement or other document which, if permitted to goon, would have the effect of destroying the property of another person,
whether that consists of tangible or intan-gible property, whether it consists -of
money or reputation :" Dixon v. Holden,
L. R., 7 Eq. 488. This was certainly a
startling doctrine, giving to a court of
chancery a new field for the exercise of
its remedial powers of injunction. Under the principle enunciated a grocer,
who should circulate in print the false
statement that he was the only dealer in
town who did not put sand in his sugar,
could be enjoined from continuing this
method of advertising by any one of his
honest business rivals ; and it would seem
to require no stretch of its jurisdiction to
give the court power to restrain our supposed lying groceryman from repeating
the same statement orally. The vice
chancellor has been much criticized by
other judges for going too far in his desire to protect intangible property, and it
will clearly appear from the cases referred to below that in Dixon v. Holden, and
in other cases as well, he went beyond the
verge of the law. Some later English
cases, however, aided by the operation of
the Judicature Acts, have established beyond question the power of the courts to
restrain the publication of a libel which
is likely to injure one in his trade, whether the injunction may come directly to

specific property or indirectly through
damage to his reputation.
In this country, on the other hand,
wrongs inflicted by trade-libel do not
seem to have received much attention
from courts of equity, and the equitable
principle now fully developed in England
is here hardly out of bud. The English
cases have usually grown out of unwarranted threats by owners of patents to sue
for infringement, and as the development
of inventions and increase of property
interests in patent rights have nowhere
in the world been greater than in the
United States, it may perhaps seem
strange that the law referred to should
have received so slight a development on
this side of the Atlantic. The law protecting the direct infringement of patents
has kept pace with their increase, but the
jurisdiction of the courts to secure the
public against a wrongful use of patent
monopolies has progressed hardly at all.
Consequently there has arisen a pernicious practice, by which unscrupulous
owners of patentr of questionable validity are daily extorting money from
innocent dealers and working lasting injury to honest manufacturers.
The patentee of a blind fastener, for example, sows broadcast his circulars stating that all fasteners sold by the John
Smith Manufacturing Co., are made in
violation of his rights, and that any one
who sells the goods of that company's
manufacture is accountable to him as an
infringer. These circulars carry the further information that every one who has
participated in the sale or use of said
goods must, in order to protect himself
from suit, pay damages for past infringement and sell only under a license in the
future.
This method of business enterprise is
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obviously justifiable and even necessary
under some circumstances. When one
acting with due prudence and sagacity
has reason to believe that his patent is
valid, he has an undoubted right to warn
a supposed infringer that a suit will be
brought against him unless he acquiesces
in te patentee's claim and pays a royalty for the privilege he is enjoying; and
in case of sudden and extensive infringement carried on simultaneously in different sections of the country the demand
upon the patentee to use this remedy becomes imperative, particularly in those
instances where the patent has already
been affirmed by judicial decree. In
many cases, however, "the course taken
by complainants fuggests the charge that
they intend to obtain many of the advantages of an injunction hy harassing and
interfering with the business of a rival,
without taking the risk of a direct suit
with that rival, when they would be
responsible for the consequences of
their' *act." Of course the failure to
follow up the warnings of his circular
promptly with a suit against some one
or more of the infringers, might justly
be considered strong evidence that he
was acting unfairly or maliciously.
Under the circumstances it has seemed
worth the while to examine with some care
the English cases before referred to, to
see how far the principles which they.
establish are applicable to cases that
may arise in this country, and to inquire
what is the American law upon this
general subject.
In the year preceding his decision in
Dixon v. Holden, supra, Vice-Chancellor
MA&uws ordered an injunction to issue
enjoining the posting of placards which
were calculated to intimidate workmen
from hiring themselves to "the complainants, the ground of the order being
that the effect of the placards was to
destroy the complainant's property:
Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L.
R., 6 Eq. 551.
Chief Justice GRAY, of Massachu-

setts, speaking in 1872, said the opinions of MALImNs in these cases (and also
in Rollins v. Rinks, L. R., 13 Eq. 355),
appeared to be "so inconsistent with
previous English authorities, and with
settled principles, that it would be
superfluous to consider whether, upon
the facts before him, his decisions can
be supported :" Boston Diatite Co. v.
Florence, 114 Mass. 69. The earliest
case cited by MALINs in support of his
construction of the law, is Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402 (1818), where
Lord BLEoN prohibited the publication
of copies of letters originally written by
the complainant to the respondent, and
afterwards returned to the writer after
copies had secretly been taken. The
jurisdiction was put on a right of property in the writer. The reporter's
note of this case refers to 4 Burroughs
2331, where counsel speak of two unreported cases in which similar decisions
were reached on the same ground. In
2 Brown's Cas. in Parl. 138, one class
of injunctions issuing out of Chancery is
said to be: "Injunctions for printing
unpublished manuscripts without license
from the author." The ground of the
jurisdiction is not stated. In Seeley v.
Isher, 11 Sim. 581 (1841), a short
case citing no authorities, an injunction
was refused because the advertisement
complained of did not hold out that the
defendants' work contained any matter
which was the exclusive property of the
plaintiff, although it did contain
allegations disparaging the plaintiff's
work. Lord Chancellor COTTEXHAX
said, that though such an allegation
might be the subject of an action at law,
as being a libel on the plaintiff's edition,
it was not a subject of an injunction.
The Court of Sessions, in Fleming v.
Newton (four lords dissenting), inter
dicted the publication of a register containing the names of bankrupts ; but the
decree was reversed in the House of
Lords: Fleming v. Newton, I H. L.
Cas. 363. Lord COTTENHAM pointed
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out that the question whether the publication of a libel could be restrained was
not necessarily involved, because the
register was a public record. The ease
of Emperorof Austria v. Day and Kossuth, 3 De G., F. & J. 217, is somewhat anomalous, but it is believed that
the wrong complained of was a direct
injury to property. The defendants, in
Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561, were
restrained from saying, in a printed
prospectus, that the plaintiff was a
trustee of a joint-stock company. No
case was cited either by counsel or by
the court; nor is the ground of jurisdiction given, but obviously it is that
upon which the courts rely In trademark cases, viz. : right of property in
one's name. A year later a quack
doctor flooded the markets with "Sir
James Clark's Consumption Pills,"
and the plaintiff, Dr. Clark (not himself a dealer in pills), complained to the
court that the defendant's acts were
bringing his professional skill into disrepute: Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav.
112. The Master of the Rolls dismissed the bill because the doctor
sought merely to stop the publication of
a libel.
These are all the English cases upon
the question under consideration prior to
the decisions of Vice-Chancellor IL.imNs,
above referred to. The path of our
inquiry does not lie across the field of
trade-mark and copyright cases: in
those the equitable jurisdiction has long
been settled. In no case, before that
of Springhead Spinning Co. v. 1?iley,
supra (1868), do we find any germs of
the doctrine that pecuniary damage
resulting from a libel affords a ground
for the exercise of the remedial powers
of injunction : and it is clear that the
vice-chancellor's judgments, both in
this case and in Dixon v. Holden,
supra, were acts of judicial legislation.
In the first case he professed to find
authority for his position in .Routh v.
Webster, supra, and in the second, he

relied upon the precedent of his own
decision thus erroneously founded. Of
the subsequent cases, Nulkern v. Ward,
L. R., 13 Eq. 619, is to the effect that
the court had jurisdiction to restrain the
publication of a libel, though injurious
to property, Dixon v. Holden being
commented upon adversely. Then follows an important case that overrules
Dixon v. Holden, and in which CAIRINs,
L. C., and JAMEs, L. J., criticize
MALINs's view of the law severely-the
case of Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142 (1874).
The
court was asked to stop the publication
of a pamphlet which alleged, in substance, that the plaintiff company was
managed with reckless extravagance.
An injunction was refused, the decision
affirming the dcctrine that equity had no
jurisdiction to restrain the circulation
of a libel.
We come now to the series of cases decided since the passage of the Judicature
Act of 1873. Itis believed that the provisions of that act will be found to justify
an extension of the equitable principle
here under discussion beyond the limits
imposed by the law as it then was; but
curiously enough the process of development seems to have gone on without much
reference to the legislative enactment.
The first case in the series is that of 27lorleg's Cattle Food Co.v. Massam, 6 Ch.
Div. 582, on motion, and 14 Ch. Div. 762
(1880). Joseph Thorley had extensively advertised and sold a compound under
the name of "Thorley's Food for Cattle."
The process of manufacture was not patented and was known not only to Mr.
Thorley but also to his brother, who managed the business. After Joseph died
the business was continued by the defendant, his executor; but the surviving
brother withdrew from the management,
organized the plaintiff company, and began the manufacture of the same food
eompound and under the same name as
before. Thereupon the defendant, bycirculars cautioned the public against pur-
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chasing any "Thorley's Food for Catfie" not made by his establishment, "the
proprietors of which were alone posessed of the secret for compounding the famous condiment." The defendants rested their case on Prudential Assurance
Co.. v. Knott, supra. The Vice Chancelbr, MALiNs, said he should have no
hesitation in stopping the defendant's act
except for that case, and he was inclined
to agree with a suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel that that case was controlled and superseded by the Judicature
Act. But as the point was a new one he
preferred to reserve his views until the
hearing. When the, cause came on for
trial he granted the injunction, but did
not refer to the effect of the statute ; nor
was it discussed by any of the judges on
appeal, when the decree was affirmed.
The opinions by J.xcs, BAGGALLY and
BRArWELL are short, and no case is
cited in either of them. MA.is cited
'
several cases of law and remarked, I I
think these cases eatablish this-I do not
go into the general question of libelbut they have established the doctrine
that where one man publishes that which
is injurious to another in his trade or
business, that publication is actionable;
and, being actionable, will be stayed by
injunction, because it is a wrong which
ought not to be repeated." The judges
on appeal apparently go on the same
ground. Here, then, we find a doctrine
announced confidently and without any
apology in direct conflict with Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App.
142, and in accord with MALINS'S early
views, which that case and others had
properly repudiated. It is submitted,
then, that the doctrine of the Thorley
Food case must find its sanction, if at all,
in some enlarged jurisdiction given by
the Judicature Act. This act (36 & 37
Vict. ch. 66, 16) transferred to the High
Court of Justice "the jurisdiction which,
at the commencement of this act, was
vested in, or capable of being exercised
by all or any one or more of the judges

in the said courts (all the common law
courts] respectively, sitting in court or
chambers or elsewhere, when acting as
judges or a judge in pursuance of any
statute, law, or custom, and all powers
given to any such court, or to any such
judges or judge by any statute; and also
all ministerial powers, duties and authorities, incident to atly and every part of
Now,
the jurisdiction so transferred."
the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,
17 & 18 Vict. ch. 125 79, 81, 82, provided that " in all cases of breach of contract or other injury, where the party injured is entitled to maintain and has
brought an action, he may * * * claim
a writ of injunction against the repetition
or continuance of such breach of contract
or otherinjury, "'etc.; and " in such action
judgment may be given that the writ of
injunction do or do not issue, as justice
may require." - [ 82 allows a plaintiff
at any time after the commencement
of his action to apply ex parte for
an injunction.] Nothing could be clearer, it seems to us, than that this provision, operating upon the powers of Chancery through the enactment of 1873,
made a distinct addition to the field of
equity jurisdiction. The increased power would seem to authorize an injunction
whenever such facts are shown as would
support an action at law for damages.
Whether the courts will give the language of the two~statutes taken together
such a liberal construction may be
doubted, but its scope is clearly sufficient
to justify the decision in the Thorley
Food case ; and it may confidently be asserted that without the helpful interference of these acts that case could not be
good law.
In Day v. Browrigg, 10 Ch. Div. 294
(1878)-a case where MkLiws's zeal to
afford the injured redress had again carried him beyond the verge of the lawSir GEORGE JESSEL repudiated a suggestion by counsel that the act gave the court
power to legislate, and JAxEs, L. J., said
that the authority given by sub-section
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8, ,25, to grant injunctions in all cases cent English cases lie says ; "This exin which it shall appear to the court tension of the jurisdiction is not based,
"just or convenient" does not in the as it seems, upon any statutory enlargeleast alter the principles on which the ment of the inherent powers of equity ;
court must act. In Beddow v. Beddow, but is the result of the new system by
9 Ch.Div. 89 (1878) JESSEL remarked : which the one court is empowered to ad"In my opinion, having regard to the two minister both legal and equitable remeacts of Parliament, I have unlimited dies in any and all actions." But as he
power to grant an injunction where it does not cite or undertake to discuss the
would be right or just to do so: and provisions of the Judicature Act above
quoted it is perhaps fair to conclude that
what is right or just must be decided,
not by the caprice of the judge, but ac- the statement was made without a carecording to sufficient legal reasons or ful examination of the effect of that staton settled legal principles." See a re- ute. The sentence immediately followmark by COLERIDGE, C. J., in Saxbk v. ing the one here quoted from the learned
Easterbrook, 3 C. P. Div. 339. In Hin- author is: "The American courts seem,
richs v. Bendes, (not in the reports, but thus far, unwilling to follow the example
found in Weekly Notes, January 1878 of the recent English decisions, and they
page II). JESSEL makes another sugges- decline to extend the jurisdiction so as to
tion as to the effect of the statutes. He restrain such torts as libels on business,
ordered the plaintiff's motion to stand slanders of title, and the like." If the
over till the hearing, observing that he writer's views are correct, there is a good
was not prepared to say that, if under reason for this unwilingness of the
the Judicature Act a party could sustain American Courts.
There is one important qualification
an iction for libel, the court would not
at the hearing, while awarding damages to which this liberal doctrine of the English law is subject tlat has not' directly
for the libel, restrain the continuance of
it.
tFRY,
J., interrupting the counsel in been noticed, viz.: the complainant must
.Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. Div. 867, show that the injurious act is aimed at
said; "In Beddow v. Beddow, JEssL, him. The mere fact that the repetition
M. R., appears to have thought that the of the acts complained of will continue
power of granting injunctions has been to do him harm will not entitle him to
enlarged by the Judicature Act ;" and equitable relief: to make his bill good on
the counsel replied: "His decision only demurrer he must aver that the defendant
went to this extent, that the Chancery is acting maliciously or state facts from
Division has now the same power of which malice maybe inferred. Thisnegranting injunctions which was given to cessary element of the plaintiff's case will
the Courts of Common Law by 79 of
be found in all of the cases where an inthe Com. Law Proced. Act, 1854."
junction has been granted; and whenHill v. Hart Davies, 21 Ch. Div. 798 ever such an inference has not been plain
(1882), the latest case of any importance, the relief sought has been denied. For
holds that the general doctrine may be example, a defendant who changed the
applied in favor of a joint stock com- name of his estate (previously called
pany as well as an individual, but the "Ashford Lodge") to "Ashford Villa"
Judicature Act is not mentioned.
and thereby lessened the value of the
The writer is aware that Professor
plaintiff's house, which had been known
Pomeroy's new treatise on Equity Juris- by that name for forty years, demurred
prudence (Vol. Hr., 1358) contains a successfully to the bill, because it did not
statement in conflict with the views above allege that the plaintiff acted maliciously.
expressed. Referring to some of the re- Day v. Browning, supra. The decision
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in this case was given on appeal from a
decision by MALINS, who had overruled
the demurrer. So, too, in Halsey v.
Brotherwod, 19 Ch. Div. 386 (1881)
where for aught that appears in the
bill, the defendant in warning people
against buying engines of the plaintiff
because they infringed the defendant's
patent, acted bona fide, the language

of Lord

COLERIDGn

was as follows:

"A statement made under such circumstances does not give a ground of action
merely because it is untrue and injurious ; there must be also the element of
mala fides and a distinct intention to injure the plaintiff apArt from the honest
defence of the defendant's own property." But a principle that whoever acts
with reasonable and probable cause to
believe that he is only defending his own
property does no legal wrong to the injured party would be enough to support
the refusal to grant an injunction; and
it is submitted that such a principle,
stated in affirmative form, expresses
strongly enough the state of mind necessary in the wrongdoer in order to
entitle the person wronged to demand
protection in a court of equity. The jurisdiction is established in every case
where one acts under such circumstances
as would enable a reasonably prudent
man to foresee disastrous consequences
to particular individual or company, provided that he has not probable cause to
believe that he is at the same time defending his own legal. right.
Following are the chief cases at law
on the subject of libel upon trade :
Young v. Macrae, 3 B. & S. 264;
Wren v. Weild, L. R., 4 Q. B. 730 ;
Steward v. Young, L. R., 5 C. P.
122 ; Sazby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P.
Div. 339: Western Counties Manure
Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L.
R., 9 Ex. 218 ; Riding v. Smith, I
Ex; Div. 91.
The leading case is
Wren v. Weild. It contains some strong
expressions with regard to the necessity
of showing malice, but it is important to

note that the only thing decided was that
there was no evidence for the jury. A
remark by Baron RELL-Y in Riding v.
Smith, illustrates the liberal tendency of
the law, and shows the non-technical
nature of the action. " It is of little
consequefice," he says. "whether the
wrong is slander, or whether it is a
statement of any other nature calculated
prevent persons froul resorting to the
shop of the plaintiff."
The way now seems clear for saying,
confidently, that the English decisions
regarding restraints upon trade-libels in
cases arising subsequent to that of Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott (decided
just before the Judicature Act of 1873
went into operation), are not generally
applicable to cases-of trade-libel in this
country. In England, as we have seen,
the remedial power of injunction has
been made almost, if not quite, coextensive with the right to maintain an
action at law ; but one needs not to be,
reminded that, in the absence of special'
local statutes, the law is otherwise in
the United States. The point seems
obvious enough, and yet we apprehend
that it is a point one may easily overlook when citing English cases for the
purpose of guiding our courts in the
development of the doctrine under discussion.
What, let us now inquire, is the
law where courts are governed
solely by the general principles of
equity jurisprudence ? Prior to the
Judicature Act of 1873, Prudential
Assurance Co. v. Knott, supra, was
the law it England, and the same
reasons which 'supported
its doctrines there make it now an authority
here. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts cites it with approval in Boston
Diatite Co. v. Rlorence, 114 Mass. 69,
and in Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Id.
484. Both of these cases, to be sure,
were decided before the act of 1877,
which gave the court full chancery
powers ; but there is no reason to sup-
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pose that its jurisdiction was thereby
enlarged with respect to the doctrine in
question. In New York the law cannot
be said to be settled. The New York
Juvenile, 4-c., Society v. Roosevelt, 7
Daly 188 (1877), follows Prudential
Assurance Co. v. Knott, and Brandreth
v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (1839), is in
accord with the same doctrine. So, too,
is the case of Jfauger v. Dick, 55 How.
Pr. 132 (1878, Sup. Ct.), which cites
with approval the first of the two Massachusetts cases, and SpEn, J., remarked:

"The jurisdiction of a court of equity
does not extend to false representations
as to the character or quality of the
plaintiff's property or to his title thereto,
when it involves no breach of trust or
contract ; nor does it extend to cases of
libel or slander."
In Wolfe v. Burke, 56 N. Y. 115,
and Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co.,
57 Id. 119 (1874), the facts were such
that it was not necessary to pass upon
the question, so that the cases are not
authorities either way. In the latter
the court refused to grant an injunction : first, because the issues presented
questions arising under the United States
Patent Laws, and hence not within the
jurisdiction of the state courts ; and
second, because the defendant had acted
with reasonable fairness in the defence
of his supposed rights. The inference
that may be drawn from the last ground
is not of much consequence, but the case
of Croft v. Richardson, 59 How. Pr.
356, decided in the state Supreme Court
in 1880, is unquestionably opposed to
the other New York decisions. The
defendants were sending threats and
warnings to the plaintiff's customers,
alleging that a carpet exhibitor made
and sold by the plaintiffs was an infringement of the defendant's patent,
and that the plaintiffs were intending
"to make a considerable profit before
legal proceedings put a stop to their
nefarious efforts."
A motion for an
VOL. XXXII.-90

injunction was granted, the judge relying upon the Thorley Food Case (then
just reported in the Albany Law Journal), and remarking that the language
of the circular was too excessive and
ill-chosen to convey the simple information that the plaintiffs had no right to
make and sell the article of which they
claimed to be the patentees. This
decision, so far as we have been able to
learn, stands alone among the few
American cases. Of its authority it
may be said, first, that the opinion was
not given ,by a judge of the highest
court; and second, that the case upon
which it was founded was not (for
reasons already given) applicable in the
state of Sew York.
The Celluloid
Manuf. Co. v. The Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co., 13 Blatch. 375 (Southern
Dist. of N. Y.), contains a reference to
the earlier English cases, but decides
nothing. The only other decisions in
the United States that we are aware of
are: Caswell v. Central Railroad and
Banking Co., 50 Ga. 70, and Lzfe Association
qf America v. Boogher, 3 Mo.
App. 173 (1876), both of which state
the law in accordance with the doctrine
of the Massachusetts cases. The ground
of the decision, however, in the Missouri case is peculiar. To stop the circulation of the printed matter, libellous
as it might be, would be to violate
the state constitutional provision that
"every person may freely speak, write
or print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
The responsibility laid in the qualifying
clause was held to be only such as the
courts may enforce, civilly or criminally,
after the -abuse has occurred. The
question would seem to us to have been
brought before the Missouri court apart
from any consideration of the constitutional provision, and to have raised
just the points that are involved in the
decision of the main question by any
court of general equity jurisdiction but
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the judges in the case chose a short cut
to a determination of the matter in the
way we have here indicated.
The following, if not an exhaustive
list of the classes of cases in which
injunctions are granted to prevent
the commission of a tort, certainly
contains every class in which, by
analogy, such cases as we have
been considering might fall: waste,
trespasses, nuisances, infringement,
patents and copyrights, literary property (including works of art), as distinct from copyrightt trade-marks. See
Pomeroy, -vol. iii., sects. 1346-1358.
The principle which will thread them
all is, that a court will act in behalf of
private as distinguished from public
interests only where it may prevent a
direct and immediate injury to some
species of property. The mere analogy
of preventing trespassers or any of the
wrongs here enumerated, is not enough
to warrant an exercise of the jurisdiction. Perhaps a court would be justified in interfering in favor of one injured
by false statements persistently made,
which lessened the value of his goods by
slandering his title to them.
The
analogy presented by such a case might
be sufficiently close to the principle of
the cases which received the protecting
power of injunction; but the jurisdiction could not be stretched further
across never so slight a distinction,

RECENT
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without admitting the whole line of
cases which come within the scope of the
English doctrine.
It is to be regretted that the line is
drawn thus sharply, for one may fairly
say, the greater protection afforded by
the English courts is demanded by a
just regard for the vastness and variety
of our commercial interests. Our jurisprudence must in some way meet that
demand. In course of time the result
might slowly be worked out by the
judges unaided by assistance from the
legislators, but an immediate development reaching to the desired end could
not be effected without a palpable violation of judicial functions. Legislation
therefore is needed, and needed now.
Let the law-makers take the matter in
hand, recognising fully the defect of the
common-law theory which justifies interference with individual freedom not
until after the person has actually committed -a wrong, and enact for us statutes which shall embody substantially
the provisions of the judicature acts.
The ideal remedy," says Professor
Pomeroy, "1in any perfect system of
administering justice would he that
which absolutely prevents the commission
of a wrong-not that which awards
punishment or satisfaction for a wrong
after it is committed."
ROBERT P.

CLApP.

Boston.

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
STATE v. STATE MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD.
The Minnesota stat. of 1883, regulating the practice of medicine, requires, as a
condition of the right to practice as a physician (except as to those who have been
engaged five years in practice in this state), a certificate of qualification from the
faculty of the medical department of the state university. Section 9 of the act
authorizes this board to refuse such certificate to those guilty of unprofessional or
-dishonorable conduct. The relator was refused a certificate upon the ground that,
as the board determified, he was guilty of unprofessional and dishonorable conduct.

STATE v. STATE MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD.
field, 1. The appellant had a right to be heard upon the investigation as to his conduct. 2. The word "unprofessional," in section 9, is used convertibly with "dishonorable," having a like meaning. 3. The act is not unconstitutional. 4. The
relator is not entitled to a remedy by mandamus to secure a review of the correctness or the reversal of the determination of the board.
APPEAL from an order of the District Court of Ramsey county,
quashing an alternative writ of mandamus.

Sleeper &' Donaldson, for appellant.
W. JT. Hahn, Attorney-General, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DICKINSON, J.-The relator seeks by mandamus to compel the
State Medical Examining Board to issue to him the certificate
required by chapter 125 of the Laws of 1883, to authorize him to
practice the profession of a physician in this state. He has
appealed from an order of the District Court quashing an alternative writ.
The act referred to creates a board of medical examiners, consisting of the faculty of the medical department of the University
of Minnesota. It requires all persons, excepting such as have
been practising medicine five years within the state, as a condition
of the right to practise, to procure from this board its certificate
or diploma. "Graduates in medicine are to receive a certificate,
upon their diploma being presented to the board and found to be
genuine. Other applicants for certificates are required to pass a
satisfactory examination before this board." Section 9 of the act
contains this provision: "The board of examiners may refuse
certificates to individuals guilty of unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct, and they may revoke certificates for like causes."
It appears that the relator applied for a certificate from the
board, presenting a diploma, which was found to be genuine,
showing that he was a graduate of the Louisville (Kentucky) Medical College, in which institution he bad passed the prescribed
course of study. His application was refused only upon the ground
that, as the board considered and determined, the relator was
guilty of unprofessional and dishonorable conduct, and was at that
time conducting himself in an unprofessional and dishonorable
manner, in advertising himself through the newspapers and by
circulars to be a medicine man of the .Winnebago tribe of Indians,
adopted by that tribe, and assuming the name of "White Beaver;"

716

STATE v. STATE MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD.

and claiming in such publication the proprietorship of certain specific remedies, one of which he claimed would cure cholera morbus
when taken internally, and rheumatism when applied externally;
which claims are alleged by the respondents to be untrue and
impossible.
We first consider the question as to the constitutionality of
that part of the act (section 9) upon which the refusal of the board
to grant, its certificate is based. The relator urges this objection
upon the grounds that the act gives to the appellant no opportunity
to be heard in his own defence in relation to any charge of unprofessional and dishonorable conduct, and that by its enforcement he
is deprived of his property without due process of law. These
objections to the validity of the act cannot be sustained. The vocation of the physician is in itself a lawful one, and the right of any
person to engage in it is only subject to such restrictions as the
legislature may impose in the exercise of its general police power.
While, therefore, the right to engage in this practice is a qualified
one, even that qualified right is not to be arbitrarily, and without
reason denied. It is so opposed to the principles of the common
law that any fact affecting the rights of an individual shall be
investigated and determined ex yarte, and without opportunity
being afforded to the party to be affected thereby to be heard (4
BI. Com. 282, 283; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio (pt. 2,) 82; Murdock
v. Phillips Academy, 12 Pick. 244), that this act- should not be
construed as contemplating such a procdeding unless that purpose
is expressed in the plainest terms. While the act does not prescribe the manner in which the proceedings for the determination
of the matters referred to in section 9 shall be conducted, there is
nothing to indicate that it was intended that such investigations,
and the determination of the fact, should be made ex parte, or
without reasonable opportunity given to the party interested to be
heard. The contrary conclusion is rather indicated by the requirement that the board shall "take testimony in all matters relating
to the duties," and by the fact that a right of appeal from the
determination of the board is conferred.
It may be stated as a general prop'osition that any person has a
right to pursue any lawful calling, but in respect to certain occupations, not in themselves unlawful, this right is necessarily subject
to legislative restrictions from considerations of public policy. In
the profession of medicine, as in that of the law, so great is the neces-
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sity for special qualifications in the practitioner, and so injurious
the consequences likely to result from a want of it, that the power
of the legislature to prescribe such reasonable conditions as are
calculated to exclude from the profession those who are unfitted to
discharge its duties, cannot be doubted: .Hewitt v. Charier, 16
Pick. 353; Spaulding v. Alford, I Id. 33; Wright v. Lanckton;
19 Id. 288; Cooley Const. Lim. 745. Statutes for the accomplishment of this purpose have been very common, containing
provisions similar to those found in this act; that is, requiring, as
a condition of the right to practice the profession, that the practitioner shall be a graduate of an institution for medical instruction,
or shall have a certificate of his qualification from some recognised body of men learned in the science. Such requirements
have been incorporated into the laws of Mas achusetts, Maine,
New York, Ohio, Illinois, Alabama, Georgia and Texas, and
probably in other states, and their validity has never, we think,
been judicially denied; nor, as we understand, does the relator
question it here.
But the legislature has surely the same power to require, as a
condition of the right to practise the profession, that the petitioner
shall be possessed of the qualifications of honor and good moral
character, as it has to require that he shall be learned in the profession. It cannot be doubted that the legislature has authority,
in the exercise of its general police power, to make such reasonable
requirements as may be calculated to bar from admission to this
profession dishonorable men, whose principles or practices are such
as to render them unfit to be intrusted with the discharge of its
duties. And as the duty of determining upon these qualifications,
both as to learning and skill, and as to honor and moral fitness,
must from necessity be committed to some person or body other
than the legislature, we see no reason why it may not be committed
to the legally constituted body of men, learned in this profession,
named in this act.
We are referred to no decision, and we have found none, sustaining the position of the relator, that an adverse determination
of such a body upon such a question, by reason of which the appellant is precluded from engaging in the practice of his profession,
deprives him of his property without due process of law, or that
such enactments are for any reason unconstitutional. On the contrary, such enactments have been repeatedly enforced, and their
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constitutionality sustained, in cases involving a consideration of
those provisions relating to the mode of determining the qualifications of the practitioner in respect to learning. See cases above
cited; also Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. 395; State v. Goldman, 44 Tex. 104; Richardson v. -Dorman,28 Ala. 679; Bibber
v. Simpson, 59 Me. 181.
The legislative requirement of a good moral character has also
been sustained: Thompson v. iTazen, 25 Me. 104. See also, Wert
v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347, 349. As has been already suggested,
there can be no distinction, upon constitutional grounds, as to the
mode of determining in regard to professional or intellectual fitness,
and as to the moral fitness for the profession.

The means pro-

perly adopted by the legislature to determine the one, cannot be
said to be unconstitutional when prescribed for the determination
of the other.
We will add, as our construction of the words "unprofessional
or dishonorable conduct," as used in section .9, that we do not
think that the legislature contemplated matters of merely professional ethics, but that the term "unprofessional " was used convertibly with " dishonorable." The .meaning may be expressed
by using the conjunctive and in place of the disjunctive or : Wert
v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347-350; Weston v. Loyhed, 30 Minn.
221.

It might, for instance, be deemed unprofessional for the

members of one school of medical practice to consult professionally
with a member of a different school; but such matters are not
within the plain purpose of the act, which was the affording of protection to the people against ignorant, unqualified and unworthy
practitioners of this profession.
Our conclusion being that the law under which the board acted
was constitutional, it is apparent that the relator cannot, by mandamus, compel the issuing of a certificate to him. The action of
the board is not merely ministerial, but partakes of a. judicial
character. It is to inquire concerning and to determine as to the
existence of certain facts, and whether it should grant a certificate
of qualification to an applicant must depend upon that determination. The board has not refused or neglected to act upon the
matter submitted to it. It has decided upon the application, and
the correctness of that decision, involving the exercise of the judgment of the members of the board, cannot be brought into review
by this proceeding, and is not properly before us: The King v.
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Licensing Justices, 4 Dowl. & R. 735; The King v. Sheriffs of
York, 3 Barn. & Adol. 770; Hfowland v. Eldredge, 48 iN. Y.
457. See Matter of Dorsey, 7 Port. (Ala.) 392; People v. Judge
of JJayne County Courts, 1 Mich. 359; Roole v. IKinkead, 16
Nev. 217.
The order is affirmed.
In England the practice of the healing
art during the middle ages was, as a
rule, confined to the priests-the only
educated class-but ignorant pretenders
to science abounded then as now, and as
early as 1422, 9 H. V., a statute was
proposed enacting that, "No one shall
use the mysterie of fysyk puless he
hath studied in some university, and is
at least a bachelor in that science (the
penalty being 101.), and every woman
who shall practise physick shall suffer
the same penalty." This seems never
to have had the effect of an act of parliament, but in the 3 H. VIII., c. 9,
appears an act for the appointing of
physicians and surgeons, which, after
reciting the necessity of skill in the arts
of medicine and surgery, and deploring
that they are daily exercised by a great
multitude of ignorant persons, enacts
that "no person within the city of London, nor within seven miles of the same,
take upon himself to exercise or occupy
as a physician or surgeon except he be
first examined, approved and admitted
by the Bishops of London or the Dean
of Pauls for the time being, calling to
him or them four doctors of physic."
This act also provided for the admission
of physicians outside of these limits, by
an examination by the bishop of the
diocese. The superintendence of the
bishops was taken away by a royal
charter dated September 28th 1518,
incorporating the Royal College of Physicians, confirmed by the statute of 14
H. VIII. Te acts of 32" H. VIII.
and I Mary, sect. 2, conferred upon this
college great privileges, and forbade any
one to practise in London, or seven
miles distant, save those licensed by the

college, upon penalty of 51. a month.
All persons were likewise forbidden to
practise beyond the seven miles radius,
unless they were first examined by the
president and three of the elects, except
they had become graduates of Oxford
or Cambridge.
In Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 107, it was
resolved that none can be punished for
practising physic in London but by forfeiture 51., and if any practise physic
for less than a month he shall forfeit
nothing. It was ruled by Lord HOLT,
in College of Physiciansv. Levett, I Ld.
Raym. 472, where the defendant alla.ged
that he was a graduate doctor of Oxford,
that such could not practise within
London or seven miles distant, without
the license of the College of Physicians:
College of Physicians v. West, 10 Mod.
353. With regard to surgeons and
apothecaries, the ancient guild of barber
surgeons was incorporated as early as I
Ed. IV., and the society of apothecaries
received their charter 15 Jac. I. These
charters were confirmed by various
enactments-a list of them will be found
in Wilcocks on the Law of the Medical
Professions. In the year 1858, the
Medical Act became a law, establishing
the General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United
Kingdom, and regulating the qualification of practitioners in medicine and
surgery. Although a medical man possess every title and qualification which
any university can bestow, unless his
name be duly entered on the .Medical
Registry e cannot recover fees or
charges : Turner v. Reynal, 14 C. B., N.
S. 328; Bloqg v. .Pnker,Ryl. & M., N.
P. 125. According to the English com-
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mor law a physician could not recover for
services rendered (Chorley v. Bolcott, 4
T. R. 317) ; the same principle applied
to barristers ; Morris v. Hunt, 1 Chitty
544; Kennedy v. Broun, 13 C. B., N.
S. 677; s. c. 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S.
357 ; Rucher v. Norman, 3 B. & C.
745. In Veitch v.-Russell, 3 Q. B. 928,
it was held that a physician was
entitled to recover-if he could prove
an actual contract, or if he acted
as a surgeon as well as a physician, he
could recover for services rendered in
that capacity. But in Gibbon v. Budd,
2 H. & C. 92, Baron BRAXWELL held
that a physician registered under the
Medical Act, who is not prohibited by
any by-law of his college, can recover
without an express contract, the presumption being that he attended the
patient, not for an honorarium but for
fees, the right to which could be enforced
by an action.
As long as an apothecary did not
charge separately for his advice, he
might attend a patient and make up and
administer proper medicines, without
having a license from the College of
Physicians or the prescription of a physician, and in so doing did not infringe
'the privilege of the college nor violate
the provisions of 14 & 15 Hen. VIII. :
Rose v. College Physicians, 5 Bro. Parl.
C. 553; Towne v. Lady Gresley, 3 C.
& P. 581 ; he could charge for his
attendance as well as for the medicine:
Handley v. Henson, 4 C. & P. 110;
Morgan v. Hallen, 8 Ad. & E. 489.
But the College of Physicians may
grant a license under the act without
restricting their licentiate from compounding and supplying for profit the
medicines they may "prescribe: AnyGen. v. Royal College oJ Physicians, 30
L. J. Ch. 757.
The above acts of parliament, and the
decisions under them, show that the different departments of medical practice
are carefully regulated in England.

Not has any question as to the constitutionality of these restrictions ever been
raised.
In this country the legislation on the
subject has been by no means harmonious. Several states have failed to
pass any statutes on the subject ; others
have passed acts making the practice of
medicine and surgery without a license or
registration, a penal offence ; other statutes making the receipt of fees dependent
on satisfying the requirements of the act ;
while New York, which had passed an
act as early as 1787 on the subject,
repealed all laws on the subject in 1844
'and re-enacted them in 1874 ; and Massachusetts, where the requirements of the
act of 1817 were particularly strict,
repealed all of these in 1838.
The right of every person to pursue
any lawful calling he may see fit, and to
do so in his own way, not encroaching
on the rights of others, is recognised in
this country, subject to certain modifications: Cooley 745. Thus, a state may
impose restrictions on dangerous or
offensive occupations as to locality, and
not thereby grant a monopoly : Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. It may
require the possession of certain qualities
to entitle men to pursue certain callings,
such as the legal or'medical profession,
the apothecaries' trade and that of engineers, pilots, &c. This right rests on
the pol'ce power of the state, while,
for the purpose of revenue, it may
impose a tax on all following a certain
calling.
A license has been defined to be that
which confers a privilege, and makes the
doing of something legal, which, if done
without it, would be illegal : Savannah
v. Charltnn, 36 Ga. 460.
A state has a right to derive a revenue from the imposition of what is
sometimes called a license, upon all persons following a certain calling: State
v. Galley, 5 Ch. 21 ; Ward v. State of
Maryland, 38 Md.; s. c. 9 Am. Law

STATE v. STATE MEDIC AL EXAMINING B0ARD.
Reg. N. S. 424; License Tax Cases, 5
Wall. 462. Uiider their police power
above mentioned, they have a right
which, under certain circumstances, they
may delegate, to impose re-trictions as to
age, sex, character and attainments upon
all engaged in certain callings. As was
said by Justice BRADLry in Bardwell
v. State, 16 Wall. 142: "In the nature
of things it is not every citizen of every
age, sex and condition that is qualified
for every calling and position. It is the
prerogative of the legislature to prescribe regnlafog"rbunded on nature,
repson and experience, for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special
This was an
skill and confidence."
appeal by a woman from the decision
of an Illinois court, refusing to permit
her to become an attorney of that court.
It was held not to be in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. See also nre Taylor, 48 Md. 25. But where there was a
clause in the Constitution providing that
no person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering on or pursuing
any lawful business, vocation or profession, it was held in Mftequire's Case,
57 Cal. 604, that a city ordinance forbidding the employment of women as
waiters in bar-rooms, &e., was unconstitutional. This power cannot -usually
be delegated: Savannah v. Charlton,
supra; lit re Quong Woo, 9 Pe. Coast
L. J. 815 ; but the state may leave the
assessment of it to the court: State v.
Gazley, supra, in which case it was said
the design of a license is to protect the
community from the consequences of a
want of professional qualification. The
constitutionality of these enactments is
also insisted on by the cases cited in the
opinion of the court and Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323.
A brief review of the effect of the
statutes which have been passed in the
various states, with regard to the medical profession, upon those who have not
VO. XXXII.-91
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complied with the requirements set forth,
the position of physicians where there
are no such statutes, or where the statutes have been repealed, and the exceptions made as to certain practitioners,
will be of interest.
"By the common law of America a
physician can sue for his fees in assumsit. This is evidenced by the states
at several times having passed acts prohibiting physicians from maintaining
actions for their fees unless licensed :"'
.tndah v. McNanmee, 3 Blackf. (Ind.)
269 ; Downs v. Minchew, 30 Ala. 86 ;
MJooney v., Lloyd, 5 S. & I. 412. He
who employs one thus practising, prima
facie admits his qualifications: Crane v.
McLaw, 12 Rich (S. C.) 129; Brawn
v. Mims, 2 Mills (S. C.) 235. And
where no statute on the subject has been
passed a physician, or one practising as
.such, must conform to the course of
practice of the school be adopts : Bowman v. Woods, 1 G. Gr. (Iowa) 441 ;
Patten v. W'iggen, 51 Me. 594; 2 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 401.
He is expected to display the ordinary
skill of those in the profession : 3lcCandless v. Mc Wha, 22 Penn. St. 261 ;
Reynolds v. Graves, 3 Wis. 416; Braunberqer v. Clis, 4 Am. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 587 ; Patten v. Wiggin, supra.
Where the statutes have been repealed;
as in New York, it is held that any one
may practise physic and prescribe, &c.,
and recover for his or her services, at the
peril of being sued for malpractice and
punished for a misdemeanor, if convicted
of gross ignorance, immoral conduct or
malpractice: Rossi v. Maretzek, 4 E.
D. Smith 1; White v. Carroll, 42 N.
Y. 161 ; Bailey v. Jfogg, 4 Denio 60.
See Hewitt v. Wilcox, 1 Met. 154, as to
the Massachusetts act of 1817, and its
repeal.
Where the statute imposes a penalty
upon practising physicians, either for
failure to obtain a license, to register or
to file a certificate on removal : a party
ilthus offending may be indicted:
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liard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 69 ; State
v. Goldman, 44 Texas 107. And the
state is not bound to prove that defendant practised for a reward: State v.
Hale, 15 Mo. 606. Proof that defendant attended a single case will be sufficient to support the indictment: Antle
v. State, 6 Tex. App. 202. But it was
held in inch v. Gridley, 25 Wend. 470,
that where the statute simply imposed a
penalty, this would not of itself deprive
him of a right to recover for his services:
Bronson v. Hoffman, 7 Hun 674.
Where too, the statute enacts that
a license, registration or examination
is a pre-requisite to enable one to recover for medical services, it was held
in Down v. Miinchew, 30 Ala. 86, that
the disability is purely statutory, and a
Texas physician was permitted to recover
in Alabama, there being no evidence
that any license was required in Texas,
while a physician who had completed his
studies in Massachusetts and obtained a
license to practise in New York, was
held not entitled to recover for services
rendered in Massachusetts: Spaulding
v. Alford, I Pick. 33; Wright v.
Lanckton, 19 Id. 288.
A note given for' medical services to
one forbidden by statute to recover for
such services, is void: ffays v. Wi!liams, 27 Ala. 267.
Due notice should be given of defendant's intention to avail himself of
this defence : Jordan v. Brewin, 19 Ala.
238 ; Crane v. ceClaw, supra.
A person forbidden to charge for
medical attendance may recover for
drugs sold in the capacity of a druggist,
although he includes service and drugs
in his bill: Holland v. Adams, 21 Ala.
680. Plaintiff will be nonsuited if he
does not prove his license: Adams v.
Stewart, 5 Harring. 144; but it is said
-that a license is presumed unless the
contrary is shown: Thompson v. Sayre,
I Den. 175. If the absence of a license
is shown plaintiff must prove that he

came within some of the exceptions to
the act: Bower v. Smith, 8 Ga. 174.
It has been held that the requirement
of a license being repealed plaintiff
could not by merely presenting a diploma, which was all that the repealing
act required, recover for services 'rendered while the former act was in force:
Richardson v. Dorman, 28 Ala. 679 ;.
while in Hewitt v. Wilcox, supra, it
was said that the act of 1818 being repealed, plaintiff, an unlicensed practitioner, could recover for services rendered prior to the repeal, on the ground
that the act only interfered with the
remedy not the right: Quarlesv. Evans,
7 La. Ann. 544.
In actions of slander, the repeal or
absence of legislation as to medical
requirements, will leave it to the proof
of employment as a doctor, to show
damage for words imputing want of
skill in the profession: Crane v. McLaw, Brown v. Mimms and White v.
Carroll, supra.
By the Maine Act (Rev. Stat. 1883),
no person who has not received a degree
at a public medical college in the United
States or a license, &c., shall recover
compensation. Under this act it was
held that where plaintiff brought an
action for an injury, he could offer in
evidence a diploma from the Eclectic
Medical College of Philadelphia, to show
that he was a physician: Holmes v.
Healde, 74 Mte. 38 ; while under the
exemption laws of Michigan simply
practising is prima fade evidence that
one is a physician: Sutton v. Facey, I
Micb. 243.
The laws of New York of 1813, 2
R. L. 222, provided that no person
should practise without a diploma under
penalty oftnot collecting fees, except he
administere donly roots, barks or herbs,
the growth of the United States: Timmerman v. Morrison, 14 Johns. 369.
Under this act a person who brought suit
for botanical medicines, could not re-
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cover for his service as physician: Allcott v. Barber, I Wend. 526.
Whether the laws which regulate the
practice of physicians apply to those who
attempt to effect a cure by means not
sinctioned by any school of medicine
has been doubted. Thius, in New York,
the laws of 1874, ch. 436, R. S., which
forbid the collection of fees by a physician or surgeon not holding a diploma,
&c., do not apply to one undertaking to
effect cures by manipulation, and one
thus employed may recover a compensation agreed on although not a graduate: Smith v. Lane, 24 Hun 632 ;
while in Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick.
353, one who practised bonesetting and
reducing sprains by friction, was held to
be within the act of 1818, which provides
that no person practising physic or surgery shall be entitled to the benefit of
law for the recovery of his fees unless
licensed or a graduate. This case was
approved in Biblber v. Simpson, 59 Mfe.
181, which was an action by a medical
clairvoyant, where APPLETON, 5., in
entering a nonsuit, remarked : "The
services were medical. Whether plaintiff
calls herself a medical clairvoyant (or a
clear-seeing physician or a clairvoyant
physician), matters assuredly very little ;
such services as plaintiff claims to have
rendered purport to be and are to be
deemed medical, and are within the clear
and obvious meaning of the act of 1871,
which provides that no person except
One duly qualified shall recover any compensation for medical or surgical services." Woody. O'Kelley, 8 Cush. 406.
An ingenious attempt was made in
Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. 395, to
escape the requirements of the law.
The defendant offered to show that he
was the assignee of a patent medicine,
with the right to make, construct, use
and vend to others, to be used, a certain
improvement in the art of preparing and
administering certain medicine. NELSON, J., decided that the letters patent
were properly rejected, as they did not
authorize defendant to practise physic

and surgery within the regulation of the
statute: Jordan v. Dayton, 4 Ch. 294.
There is usually an exception ma,Ih in
the statutes in favor of those who have
been in continuous practice for a definite
period prior to the passage of the net.
In Delaware, those practising in 1820 are
excepted, in Georgia, those practising
prior to 1847. In Illinois, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania and Ohio, ten years, and
in Kansas and Texas five years practice
are considered equivalent to a diploma.
This was held to be constitutional and
not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in 9x parte Spiney, 10 Nev. 323.
This provision received a curious construction from the majority of the court
in lVert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347,
where it was decided to mean ten years
previous to the time the party's right to
practise is challenged : Bowers v. Smith,
supra. It is no defence to a suit for
malpractice, that defendant was not
licensed (Reynolds v. Graves, supra),
unless perhaps where the patient knew
of it before employing him : Musser v.
Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577.
In some states, as in. Alabama,
Louisiana, Florida, Mlissouri, and partially in New Hampshire, midwives are
excepted ; in other states no mention is
made of them. It might be an interesting question, in view of the above
decisions, how far in the last-mentioned
states they would be subject to the
penalty imposed. It is to be hoped that
the various medical and health congresses will have an influence in rendering the laws in the several states more
consistent with one another, so that the
public may, in the language of Judge
MoonE, be guarded against quacks and
empirics, without knowledge or skill
fitting them to undertake the important
and responsible duties which are necessarily devolved upon physicians, of
whose qualifications and fitness for their
discharge the general public are unable
to judge : talc v. Goldman, supra.
WIVLI..%s DRAYTONe.
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United States Circuit Court; -E D. Missouri.
WILSON v. ST. LOUIS, ETC., RAILROAi) CO.
If the interests of the parties are so identified that they must and should be decided
together, a cause cannot be removed to the United States Court if any one of the
parties on one side is a citizen of the same state with the opposite party.
W., a citizen of Missouri, having obtained judgment in Missouri against B., a
citizen of New York, caused an execution to be levied on certain stock of the
S. railroad, a Missouri corporation.' W. purchased the stocks at the execution sale
and then filed a bill in the state court against the S. railroad to compel an acknowledgment of his ownership of the stock. To this bill he made B. a party defendant.
B. removed the case to the United States Circuit Court. On a motion to remand,
Held, that there was not a separate controversy betiveen W. and B. which would

entitle the latter to remove the case.

MOTION to remand.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion, which was delivered by
MIT.ER, Circuit Justice.
The question is presented in thii manner: Wilson, who had re-covered a judgment against the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad Co., had an execution returned "no property found,"
and then took proceedings under the laws of Missouri concerning
such cases, to subject the stockholders to personal liability, and in
those proceedings he obtained'an order against the Seligmans, with
an execution issued against them for some seventy odd thousand
dollars. Under that execution the sheriff levied upon and sold certain stocks standing in their names on the books of the St. Louis,
etc., Railroad Co., and gave the usual certificate of sale. Mr. Wilson
finding that certificate unavailing, because the St. Louis, etc., Railroad Co. would not recognise his right in the premises, filed this
petition in the state court in the nature of a bill in chancery, to
compel the Railroad Co. to acknowledge his interest in the stock; to
have it registered on their books in his name, and to permit him to
receive dividends, vote, and otherwise exercise the functions of a
stockholder in that company. He also made the Seligmans parties,
on the ground that the stock stood in their names on the books of
the company, and averring that he had acquired their interest.
In that state of case, the Seligmans, filed their answer (in which
they stated that they did not own the stock at the time the judgment was rendered: against them, nor at the time of the sale to Wilson, but had parted with it, and that the certificates were then, and
ever since had been in the hands of persons to whom they sold,
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whose names they do not give), say it was sold in the ordinary business way, by indorsment with blank power of attorney, and that
they do not know where it is; at all events, they assert very roundly
that they have no interest in the stock itself-no equitable interest
-although it stood in their names on the books at the time of filing the answer of the railroad company.
Application was made by Seligman, as a citizen of New York,
on the ground of his citizenship in New York, to transfer the case
to this court, and it was done by order of the state court. It is now
moved to remand it on the ground that it was not a removable cause,
and the question that is presented is rather a question of fact than
any needed new construction of the law on the subject of removal
for the courts have decided, and it has been decided frequently, so
that the doctrine must be pretty well established at this time, that
if a non-resident party has an interest in a controversy which is
separate and. distinct, and does not necessarily involve the interest
of the other defendants in the issue, or the other party on the same
side, he can remove the whole case into the Federal courts. On*
the other hand, if the interests of the parties are so identified and
so mixed up that they must, and should be decided together, and
depend under the final decree, and must depend upon and involve
the rights of both parties, then it cannot be removed, where one of
the parties is a citizen of the same state with the plaintiff or
defendant.
I think such is the case here. The main relief sought, which
would satisfy Wilson, is that he be placed on the books of the St.
Louis, etc., Railroad Co., as the owner of that stock. To do that,
that conpany has something to do. They resist him. The powers
of this court are called into operation to compel them to do that
thing. Whether they should do it or not, depends upon the fact
whether Wilson is a rightful owner of that stock, and that depends
upon whether the sale of ihe stock was properly made, and whether
he (Wilson) acquired the right to the stock which stood in the name
of the Seligmans on the books of the railroad company, as the
owners of the stock ought to be bound by any decree which makes
the transfer out of their name into Wilson's name.
If they are not bound by it, the act is of very little value to
Wilson. If they can go on and show they owned the stock5 or that
some vendee of theirs owned the stock, why Wilson gets no good of
that. He has the right, therefore, that the question in whose name
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the stock stands on the books of the company shall be before the
court, that the decree shall bind him at the same time that it binds
the railroad company. The act to be done, the interests sought to
be enforced against both these parties, affects both, and both should
be bound by it, and therefore it is a case not transferable to the
Circuit Court of the United States, because the railroad company
is a citizen of the same state with Wilson, the plaintiff. The case
will be remanded.
I wish to suggest, however, as I have done several times of late
on the circuit, that in these cases of removal, when remanded, if the
court commits an error, it is speedily remediable in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Take this particular case in which the
order to remand is made. The other party can take a writ of error
to-morrow, have the record filed in the Supreme Court of the United
States on the first day of the term, go there and make his motion
to have the case advanced and heard, prepare his brief, submit it to
the court, and it can be decided within ten days from the second
.Monday in October. The court has found this trouble in these cases,
that where a case is not remanded, the court goes on and exercises
jurisdiction, and it comes upon a writ of error afterwards, but in
cases where it is remanded the Federal courts suspend and do nothing at all. Our court has felt the necessity of bringing that class
of cases within the rule of advancement, so that they are advanced
and heard out of their order always when the party against whom
the judgment is rendered-takes the necessary steps to have it reversed. So, it is with less hesitation that we order the remanding
of this case, from the fact that by the first day of November, Mr.
Seligman can have the question decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, whether we shall change the order or not.
Cases of removal of causes under the
Removal Act of March 3d 1875, on
the ground of citizenship, are continually arising in the state or federal
courts, and the question is of growing
importance. Prior to the decision of
the Removal Cases (100 U. S. 457), the
decisions interpreting the second section
of this act (18 Stat. at Large, part 3, p.
470), were far from being harmonious;
but, since that decision, this conflict
has ceased.
The cases on this subject were col-

lected in a note to Stone v. Sargent,
decided-by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in October 1880 (129
Mass. 503), by Richard C. Dale, Esq.,
which note, together with the case, was
published in 20 American Law Register, N. S. 31. Since then many interesting eases, involving the question
in the principal case have arisen, that
will be considered in this note.
I. PRBLimIARy.-The fundamental
fact upon which jurisdiction in these
controversies depends, is the requisite
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citizenship of the parties considered
relative to each other. The relation of
the parties is a jurisdictional relation,
for it is upon this ground that removal
may be granted. The real controversy
must be between citizens of different
states to constitute it a case of federal
cognisance. With the exception of the
case of an assignee, which will be hereafter noticed, if the cause could have
been originally .brought in the United
States courts, because of the diversity
of citizenship, it is removable. The
rules, as declared by the Supreme
Court, governing the former class of
cases, are equally applicable to the latter:
Pacific Railway Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U.
S. 297. See Levy v. Ladede Bank,
18 Fed. Rep. 193.
I. LEGAL ELEM1ENT.-The essential
elements, where diversity of citizenship
is the ground of removal, may be enumerated as follows: 1. The party on
the one side must have a citizenship
different from that of the party to the
suit on the other. It is immaterial
whether the party upon either side consists of one or more persons. 2. For
the purpose of removing the suit, these
parties may be "placed on different
sides of tile
matter in dispute according
to the facts," so that one side will be
"citizens of different states from those
on the other." 3. After this is done,
those upon either side may remove the
suit, provided they all unite in the petition therefor: Spear on Fed. Juris.
494; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S.
205 ; The Removal Cases, 100 Id. 457.

Memphis, Carthage, .-c., Railroad Co.,
2 McCrary C. Ct. 156. A proper suit
will be removed at the instance of either
party: Gillespie v. Jamieson, 12 Phila.
(Pa.) 176 ; Hosher v. St. Louis, I., hf.
4- S. Railway Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 849.
Where it is doubtful whether the state
or federal courts have jurisdiction, it
has been held the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the state courts:
Levy v. Leclede Bank, 18 Fed. Rep.
193. If one or more of the real
parties in interest on one side are citizens of the same state with any of the
parties on'the other, the suit cannot be
removed. In Fraser v. Jennison, 106
U. S. 191 ; s. c. Dig., 22 Am.L. Reg.
151, a will was offered for probate by
the parties named therein as executors,
who were citizens of Michigan, and was
opposed by contestants also citizens of
Michigan, with the exception of two,
who prayed for a removal to the Federal
Circuit Court. A removal was refused,
because the dispute was not wholly
"between citizens of different states."
If there is a doubt as to tha existence
of the jurisdictional fact, the parties
may be examined upon the question,
and the court may direct the proper
pleadings to be filed to raise the issues
involved in such questions: Gribble v.
PioneerPress Co., 5 McCrary C. Ct. 73.
If the main and principal controversy
is wholly between citizens of the same
state, it cannot be removed : Corbin v.
Van Bunt, 105 U. S. 576.

(b.) CORPORATIoNS.
1. Generally. -Peculiar
questions
sometimes arise concerning the citizenCONTROVERSY " BETWEEN CITIZENS
ship of corporations, which cannot arise
OF DIFFERENT STATES."
in case of individuals. For jurisdic(a.) GENERALLY.-The diversity of
tional purposes a corporation is to be
citizenship must be real. The fact that regarded as a citizen of the state by
a corporation has its principal place of
whose laws it was created, even though
business in a certain district is -noground it have no place of business and no
of removal: Guinn v. Iowa Central office or officers in such state, and has a
Railway Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 323. The place of business and office in another
controversy must be wholly between state : The Pacific Railway Co. v. Miscitizens of different states: Walsh v. souri 4- Pacific Railway Co., 5 McCrary
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A railroad corporation
C. Ct. 373.
running through several states and
chartered by each of them, when sued in
one of those states as a citizen of such
state, cannot see up that it is likewise a
citizen of another state and have a
removal of the cause : Eoryie -v. Boston
4§-M. Railroad Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 50,
and cases in opinion. See also Muller
v. Dows, 94 U. S., 444 ; Railway Co. v.
In Mtemphis 4Whltton, 13 Wall. 270.
Charleston RailroadCo. v. Alabama, 107
U. S. 581; s. a. 22 Am. L. Reg.
(Dig.) 623, the action was commenced
in a state court of Alabama. The railroad petitioned for and obtained a
removal to the federal court, claiming
to be a citizen of Tennessee, where it
had been previously incorporated, but
was subsequently made by statute of
Alabama art Alabama corporation.
Upon motion of plaintiff the cause was
remanded to the state court. On appeal
it was held not removable as the railroad company was a citizen of Alabama
only for the purposes of jurisdiction.
See Chicago and Western lnd. Railroad
Co. v. Lake Shore 4- Michigan Southern
Railroad, 10 Biss. C. Ct. 122 ; Buell
v. Cincinnati, Effingham, 4-c., Construction Co., Id. 55. In Davies v. Lathrop,
20 Blatchf. C. Ct. 397, citizens of New
York, by leave of court, brought suit in
a state court of New York against a
citizen of New Jersey, who bad been
appointed both by the New York and
the New Jersey courts receiver of a corporation having property in each state.
A removal to the federal courts was
granted because of the residence of the
receiver in New Jersey. A corporation
does not become a citizen of a state for
the purposes of jurisdiction because it has
a place of business in that state : Guinn
v. Ohio Cent. Railroad,14 Fed. Rep. 323.
2. Under lease.
A railroad corporation under lease
does not acquire the citizenship of
;ts lessor for the purposes of jurisdiction; and this, though the lease

is perpetual. Thus, in an action against
it and its lessor, the suit cannot be removed to the federal court on this
ground, unless it can be shown that it is
not a material party : Crane v. Uhicago
-V. V. Railway Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 402.
In Baltinore 6- Ohio Railroad Co. v.
Koontz, 104 U. S. 5 ; s. c.(Dig.) 21 Am.
L. Reg. 143, the railroad corporation
was chartered in Maryland, and leased
and operated a road of a Virginia corporation under the latter's franchise.
Suit was commenced against it in a Virginia state court. Upon application a
removal was allowed it to the federal
court because of its citizenship in Maryland.
3. Created by Act of Congress.
A railroad company formed under an
Act of Congress, cannot have a removal
on that ground: Myers v. Union Pacific
Railway Co., 3 McCrary C. Ct. 578;
s. o. 16 Fed. Rep. 292. To same
effect, see Wilder v. Union Bank, 9
Biss. C. C. 178, where it was held that
a national tank could not have a rernoval because it deriv6ff its existence
from an Act of Congresli See also, to
same effect, B. 4- 0. Railroad Co. v. P.
W., 4-c., Railroad Co., 17 W. Va. 812;
Henen v. B. 4- 0. Railroad, Id. 881
but see contra, Eby v. Northern Pacific
Railway Co., 13 Phila. (Pa.) 161.
1

(c.)

STATE AD CITIZEN.-The fact

that one of the parties is a state will not
make the cause removable. Thus in a suit
instituted by a state against a citizen of
another state, there is not such diversity
of citizenship as will give a removal:
State ofAla.v. Wolfe, 18 Fed. Rep. 836,
Cir. Ct. N. D. Ala., per BRUcE, D. J.

(d.;COLORABLE TRANSAOTIONS-COLLusto.-Colorable transactions or collusive transfers for the sole purpose of
giving the Federal Court jurisdiction will
notgive the right of removal. Thus where
parties convey land to a citizen of anotht state without his knowledge and
without consideration, for the sake of
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securing jurisdiction in the Federal
Court, expecting a reconveyance, though
no promise was made to that eflect, the
eause can not be removed; Coffin v.
Hlaggin, 7 Sawyer C. Ct. 509, nor will
a collusive transfer constitute such diversity of citizenship as will make the
cause one of Federal cognisance. In
such cases it is the duty of the court to
dismiss the suit on its own motion : Wl7liams v. Township of -ottawa, 104 U. S.
209.
(e.)

CHANGE OF CtTIZENS' STATUS.-

If after removal it appears that the nonresident party has parted with his interest, and the real controversy is between
citizens of the same state, the cause will be
remanded to the State Courts : Ryan
v. Young, 9 Biss. C. Ct. 63.
(f.) NOMINAL PATIE.-Nominal par-

ties are not to be considered in determining the removability of a cause. Nominal
parties are those not necessary to a determination of the real controversy. They
are parties who are not indispensable,
though they may be proper ones.
In Deford v. 11ehaf*y, 14 Fed. Rep.
181, certain defendants, citizens of the
same state with the plaintiffs, were made
parties to a bill in equity on the allegation that they were indebted te the principal defendant, and thus became real
parties to the suit and on motion to remand it was urged this fact defeated the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court. But
it was held that they were not indispensable parties to the controversy and the
motion to remand was overruled. See
note to this case by editor of Fed. Rep.,
14 Fed. Rep. 182.3; sees. c. 13Id. 481.
Bacon v. Rives, 106 U. S. 99, fully
sustains the ruling in this case. There it
was held that the fact that a defendant occupying substantially the same positionas
garnishee, was a citizen of the same state
as complainant, would not defeat a removal. To same effect see Cooke v. Seligman, 7 Fed. Rep. 263 ; Ell1s v. Sisson, 11
Id. 353; s.c. I IBiss. C. Ct. 187. It is
VOL. XX II.-92

also immaterial that certain of the defendants, made such in their representative
character as trustees, are citizens of the
same state of which the plaintiffs are also
citizens. Bates v. New, Orheans, Bltton
Rouqe, 4-c., Railroad Go., 16 Fed. Rep
294. And it has been held that where
directors of a corporation who reside in
different states, are made parties to a suit
against the corporation only as agents or
officers thereof, and are not necessary or
substantial or real parties, the cause cannot be removed on the ground of the diversity of citizenship ; Pond v. Silby, 19
Blatchf. C. Ct. 189. See also, Gudgee
v. Western . C. Ry. Co., 21 Fed. Rep.
81 ; Mutual Ljfe Ins. Co., Id. 85.
In Chester v. Wellford, 2 Flippin C.
Ct. 347,'a citizen of Tennessee filed a bill
in equity against an insurance company
chartered by Missouri, to cancel certain
policies of insurance, loan and interest
notes; for an account of premiums and
dividends, and to enjoin a sale of his
land under a deed of trust, given to secure the loan. The trustee in the deed
of trust was also a citizen of Tennessee.
The cause was held removable as the trustee was not considered an indispensable
party. See further on this point Aroma
v. Auditor, 9 Biss. C. Ct. 289 ; Sheldon
v. K., N., L. Pkt. Co., Id. 307. So in
a suit to reform a deed, the defendants
were the holders of the legal and equitable title to certain premises, which title
would be defeated by reforming the deed
as prayed, and a person claiming as lessee under the trustee, all the said defendants are necessary parties to the bill,
and if any one of them is a citizen of
the same state with the plaintiff, the cause
is not removable. New Jersey: Zinc 4Iron Co. v. Trotter, 17 Reporter4. See
also lanfield v. Swan, Ill U. S. 379 ;
s. c. 4 S. C. Rep. 510. In a bill in
equity attacking the validity of a trustee's sale under the deed of trust, and
asking leave to redeem the property, the
trustee is a necessary and not a formal party to the suit; Erans v. Faxon,
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11 Biss. C. Cc. 175. See, also, l ichell
v. Tillitoson, Id. 325. And in a will
giving executors therein a certain sum of
money to be held in trust for a specified
purpose, the executors are indispensable
parties in a suit to set aside the deed:
Rice v. Foreman, 11 Biss. C. Ct. 328.
For further authority see Dillon on Rem.
of C. (3d ed.) N. 1. to sec. 25, p. 31,
and note of Robert Desty, Esq., to Deford v. Mehaff, 14 Fed. Rep. 182, 183.

500; Kerting v. Cotzhausen, 16 Fed.
Rep. 705.
III. SEPARABLE

CONTROVERS.-If

a non-resident party has an interest in a
controversy which is separate and distinct, and does not necessarily involve
the interests of the other parties on the
same side with him, lie may remove the
entire suit. The essence of the right is
the distinctness and separableness of
the controversies involved in the suit.
Thus to entitle one of two defendants to
ARRANGEMENT OF PARTIES.-In determining whether an equitable suit is a removal, his interest must not involve
properly removable on this ground the in- that of the other defendant in the issue.
terests of the parties theret6 are to be Folsomv. ContinentalBank, 14 Fed. Rep.
considered, irrespective of their nominal 497 ; see Burk v. Flood, 6 Sawyer C.
attitude as plaintiffs or defendants, and Ct 220 ; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407
Winchester v. Loud, 108 U. S. 130, afsuch classification should determine the
fact of removability. Sayer v. LaSalle firms the rule in Hyde v. Ruble, supra:
4. Peru Gas Light 4 Coke Co., 14 Fed.
In Chicagov. Hutchinson, 15 Fed. Rep.
Rep. 69. In this case Judge DRuM129, the city commenced suit in a State
mos' remarked.: "Under a recent decisCourt against known and unknown ownion of the Supreme Court (The Removal
ers, for the condemnation of land for the
Cases, 100 U. S. 457), it is made the
opening of a street. The only controversy
duty of the court in order to determine
was as to the value of the land. A nonwhether or not, under the act of 1875, the
resident defendant, one of the unknown
cause can be removed, to inquire into the
owners, voluntarily appeared and obinterests which the various parties have in
tained a removal of his controversy to the
the controversy, and to classify them on
Federal Court. In Kerting v. Cotzhausen,
the one side or the other, not merely as
16 Fed. Rep. 705 : s. c. 11 Biss. C. Ct.
they happen to be plaintiffs or defendants,
582, an action of trespass was brought
but in accordance with their interest;
in a state court by a citizen of that state
and if when thus classified and arranged
against other citizens of the same state
it shall appear there is a controversy heand one other person, citizen of a different
tween citizens of different states, then the
state. The citizen of the latter state was
cause is properly removable."
granted a removal. To same effect see
REMOVAL OP ENTIRE SuIT. -The
Stevens v. Richardson, 20Biatehif. C. Ct.
Act of March 3d 1875, contemplates 53: Tyler v. Hagerty, 2 Flippin C. Ct.
a removal of the entire suit: Dillon on 257. In Steinkuhl v. York, 2 Flip. C.
Rem. of Causes (3d ed.) p. 31, sec. Ct. 376, the action was begun in a state
25, and notes ; Barney v. Latham, 103 eourt,to remove a cloud from title against
U. S. 205 ; Blake v. MeKim, Id, 336.
the person in possession, whose title was
Thus a suit cannot be removed to the attacked, and the other defendants were
United States Court, as to one defendant, the trustee and cestui oue trust in
and left pending in the State Court as to a deed of trust, given by him to secure
another. Chambers v. Holland, 3 Mc- a debt. The plaintiff and person in posCrary C. Ct. 538 ; see Afut. Life Ins. Co., session were citizens of Tennessee, the
v. Allen, 134 Mass. 389 ; Hyde v. Ruble, trustee and cestui que trust were citizens
104 U. S.407 ; Spear on Federal Juris. of other states. The controversy be-
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tween the plantiff and non-resident defendants was held inseparable and removal was refused. See Green Bay P.
Society v. Goodrich T. Co., 10 Biss. C.
Cr. 312.
An issue between a plaintiff and a
garnishee as to the liability or indebtedness of the latter to the defendant in the
principal action, is not such a controversy as can be removed separate and
apart from the principal action. It is
simply an auxiliary proceeding dependent upon the original suit. Nor will
the fact that the garnishee proceedings
were instituted under the state statute,
concurrently with the suit against the
principal defendant, and that the principal suit had been tried and disposed
of by judgment against such defendant,
bring the garnishee suit within the contemplation of the removal act: Pratt v.
Albright, 10 Biss. C. Ct. 511. See
Farmers' L. 4- T. Co. v. Railroad Co.,
9 Id. 133. Where the main controversy is between citizens of the same
state, there being no controversy wholly
between citizens of different states which
can be fully determined as between
them, the cause is not removable : Mills
v. Cent. Railroad, 20 Fed. Rep. 449 ;
distinguishing Arapahoe v. K. P. Railway Co., 4 Dill. C. C. 277. Bybee v.
Hawkett, 6 SawyerC. Ct. 593, holds that
the suit may be removed whether the
controversy which gives the right is the
main or principal one or not. But see,
Corbin v. Van Brunt, 105 U. S. 576.
A controversy presented by an intervening petition, charging fraud in obtaining a judgment in a state court, and
also want of jurisdiction, and that the
intervenors were entitled to notice but
had none, and attacking the interlocutory
orders but not the final judgment, is
removable: in re Iowa 4- Minn. Const.
Co., 3 MeCrary C. Ct. 310. See Shimvald v. Leuis, 108 U. S. 158. And in
Langdon v. Fogg, 18 Fed. Rep. 5, it
was held that an action against several
defendants may be removed by one of

them, against whom alone there is a
separate controversy which can be fully
determined without the presence of tite
other defendants, no matter what additional controversies or grounds of action
the complaint may contain. See Brande
v. Gilchrist, 18 Fed. Rep. 465; Corbin
v. Bojes, Id. 3, where the rule in Barney
v. Latham, 103 ]1. S. 205, was followed. See Western U. Tel. Co. v.
Nat. Tel. Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 561, where
the rule in Boyd v. Gill, 19 Fed. Rep.
145, is followed, in which case it is held
that a congroversy and a cause of action
are not the same thing ; therefore a suit
against two persons jointly does not,
merely because it might have been
brought against either separatelyi involve a controversy wholly between the
plaintiff and one of them, within the
meaning of the act authorizing a removal. See Friedler v. Chotard, 19
Fed. Rep. 227.
In Sharp v. Whiteside, 19 Fed. Rep.
150, the question was the right of the
plaintiff to carry passengers into a certain park owned by one of the defendants, the other defendant being the
lessee of such park. Judge Kzn held
that there was such a separate controversy between the lessor and plaintiff
as would give a removal. See further
on this point. Moore v. N. River Const.
Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 803; Pollock v.
Louchheim, Id. 465.
So it has been held in an action of
tort, where the defendants were meabers of a commercial firm, one of them
residing in New York and the other in
Texas, as did the plaintiff, the suit cannot be removed because of the residence
of one of the defendants in New York,
for their partnership interests are joint
and inseparable: Blum v. Thomas, 16
Reporter 732 ; s. c. (Dig.) 18 Am.
Law Rev. (N. S.) 180. See Blake v.
McKim, 103 U. S. 336; Railroad Co.
v. McAllister, I Tax. L. Rev. 257
Bates v. Day, 11 Fed. Rep. 528.
So where a citizen of Massachusetts
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brought a bill in equity against B., a
citizen of the same state, and P., a citizen of Texas, which alleged that P.
owed him a certain sum, and had no
property subject to attachment, and
that B. held as trustee under a will certain property in trust to pay the income
to C. for life ; and prayed for the payneit of complainant's claim, and that the
:rustee be ordered to pay him the income, during C.'s life, until the debt
should be fully satisfied ; it was held that
neither the trustee alone, nor he and B.
jointly could have a removal: Broadway
Nat. Bk. v. Adams, 130 Mass. 431. The
same ruling was made in Danvers Savings Bank v. Thompson, Id. 490, where
a citizen of Massachusetts filed a bill
against T., a citizen of New Hampshire,
and W., of Massachusetts, to foreclose
all rights of redemption in certain certificates pledged by T. to a corporation
to secure the payment of his bond, assigned by the corporation to one D.,
who pledged them to the plaintiff as
collateral security for the payment of
.'s right to redeem the cerhis note.
tificates from the pledge wasL afterwards acquired by W. The application
for removal was made by T. and refused. See &ackhouse v. Zunts, 4 Wood
C. C. 171.
In an action against two or more
persons to appropriate property held by
them, as tenants in common to the use
of a railroad corporation, there is a
separable .controversy between such
corporation and each tenant: Northern
RPe. Tel. Co. v. Lowenberg, 18 Fed.
Rep. 339. See Snow v. Texas Trurnk
Railroad Co., 4 Wood C. C. 394;Folsom v. The Continental Batik, 4 Id.
521.
It has been held that an incidental
controversy arising after the institution
of the original suit, cannot be removed :
Ellis v. Sisson, 11 Biss. C. C. 187.
See King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395.

IV. AssiGNEE.-An

assignee may

remove a suit to the federal court, although he could not have originally
brought it in that court. In Clafm
v. Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81; an
assignee of a chose in action was
permitted to remove a suit from
the state court to the federal court,
which he could not have commenced in
the latter court. The court holding that
the clause in section 1 Aet of 1875, excepting such suits, cannot be read by implication into section two of the same
act governing removal of causes. Before this decision was made Judge Snxn~s

made the same ruling in N. D. of Iowa,
in Bell v. Noonan, 19 Fed. Rep. 225.
See also Rosenblatt v. Reliance Lumber
Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 705. And Terry v.
Town of M., 18 Fed. Rep. 657, contra,
which follows Berger v. Douglass Co., 5
Fed. Rep. 23, and Hardin v. Olsen, 14
Id. 705, but distinguishes Bushnell v.
Kennedy, 9 Wall. 392 and City of L. v.
Butler, 14 Wall. 282.

V. TIME OF CITIZENS' STATUS.Prior to the decision in Gibson v. Bruce,
108 U. S. 561, the question whether the
petition for removal to give the Federal
Court jurn-diction was sufficient if it
showed only the existence of the diver
sity of citizenship at the time of the application, or whether it must also show.
such diversity at the commencement of
the suit in the state court had been differently answered. See Spear on Fed.
Jur. 500, where result of the cases
are given. But Gibson v. Brice, supra,
expressly holds that the petition must
show the diversity both at the time of the
application and the commencement of the
controversy. Mr. Chief Justice WAITE in
giving the opinion said: "The construction of the act.is by no means free from
doubt, but on full consideration we are
of opinion that the requirement o F the old
law, that the necessary citizenship should
exist when the suit was brought, was not
abolished. We can not believe it. was
intended to allow a party to deprive a
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state court of the jurisdiction it has

Flip. C. C. 471 ; Burdick v. P':er-so,

rightfilly acquired over him by changing
his citizenship after a suit is begun, and
that would be the effect of the law if the
right of removal is made to depend only
on thu °citizenship existing at the time
a removal is applied for." See also
same ruling in Rawle v. Phielps,2

2 MAeCrary C. C. 135 : Carrwk v.
Landerman, 20 Fed. Rep. 209; 1'crru
v. Town ofVM., 18 Fed. Rep. 657 ; Brinkerlw/Jy v.
. aned Co., Id. 97 ; Irclinghuysen v. Baldwin, 19 Id. 49.
EUGENE McQuILLIN.
St. Louis, Mo.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
IN RE ALBERT GARVEY.
Under a constitutional provision conferring upon the Supreme Court power to
issue writs.of habeas corpus, a judge of that court has no power to issue such a writ
during vacation, nor can the legislature confer such power.
The writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy where the court below hba denied
tie motion of a prisoner to be released, under a statute providing that he shall be
set at liberty unless tried on or before the second term of the court.
A. was convicted of murder and sentenced.
On appeal this judgment was
reversed. The court below, without a new trial, sentenced A. for manslaughter.
The Supreme Court reversed this judgment. In the meantime more than two terms
of the court below had elapsed after the reversal of the original judgment, and the
prisoner applied to be discharged under the statute requiring trial on or before the
second term. field, that the motion should be granted.

PETITION for habeas corpuR.

The facts are fully set out in the opinion, which was delivered by
STOE, J.-The petitioner, who is imprisoned to answer to an
indictment for manslaughter, now pending in the Criminal Court
of Arapahoe county, prays to be discharged of his imprisonment
under the provisions of the eighth section of the Habeas Corpus
Act, Gen. Stat., p. 535, which is in the words following: "If any
person shall be committed for a criminal or supposed criminal
matter and not admitted to bail, and shall not be tried on or before
the second term of the court having jurisdiction of the offence, the

prisoner shall be set at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall
happen on the application of the prisoner. If such court, at the
second term, shall be satisfied that due exertions have been made
to procure the evidence for or on behalf of the people, and that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be
procured at the third term, they shall have power to continue such
case till the third term. If any such prisoner shall have been
admitted to bail for other than a capital offence, the court may
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continue the trial of said cause to a third term if it shall appear by
oath or affirmation that the witnesses for the people of the state are
absent, such witnesses being mentioned by name and the court
shown wherein their testimony is material."
The facts stated in the petition and shown by the records to
bring the case within the provisions of the statute, are that, in
March 1881, the petitioner was indicted for murder; that before he
was subjected to trial, the law of murder as to him was repealed;
that at the September term of the District Court of .Arapahde
county, the prisoner was tried, upon said indictment, for murder,
found guilty thereof, and, by said court, sentenced to the penitentiary for life. That thereafter petitioner prosecuted a writ of
error out of the Supreme Court, to reverse the judgment aforesaid, and that said judgment was, at the April term 1883, of said
Supreme Court reversed, upon the ground that, owing to the repeal
of the law of murder, as aforesaid, the petitioner could be prosecuted and punished for manslaughter only, under said indictment,
and thereupon the said cause was remanded to the said District
Court with direction to proceed according to law. That thereafter,
at the April term 1883, of the said District Court, the petitioner
was, without any trial whatsoever, -sentenced to imprisonment in
the penitentiary for the term of eight years for manslaughter, and
was imprisoned accordingly. That thereafter, at the December
term 1883, of the Supreme Court, the urisoner applied to be
enlarged from said last-mentioned imprisonment under the Habeas
Corpus Act; and thereupon, by the judgment of the said Supreme
Court, it was held that the said last-mentioned judgment of the
said District Court was void for want of a trial and verdict upon
said indictment, but, inasmuch as it appeared that petitioner stood
legally indicted of a felony, it was ordered that he be discharged
from imprisonment in the penitentiary, and be remanded to the
custody of the sheriff of Arapahoe county, unless he should give
bail in a sum fixed by this court.
It is further shown that being so remanded in pursuance of the
order of the Supreme Court as aforesaid, the petitioner was again
brought to the bar of said District Court, whereupon afterwards he
interposed his motion to be discharged, for that, although committed
for a criminal matter and not having given bail, he had not been
tried on or before the second term of the court having jurisdiction
of the offence, such delay not happening on the application of said
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petitioner, and that therefore he was entitled to be set at liberty in
pursuance of the eighth section of the Habeas Corpus Act.
That afterwards, on or about the 4th day of May 1884, the said
District Court, without determining petitioner's said motion, transmitted the record of the indictment and proceedings aforesaid into
the Criminal Court of said Arapahoe county, a court having concurrent jurisdiction of said offence, and that the motion aforesaid,
coming on there to be heard, was denied by said Criminal Court,
wherefore the petitioner applies to be set at liberty upon the present
writ of hzabeas corpus by this court.
The present application of the petitioner was first made to me,
as one of the judges of this court, at chambers, in vacation, the
latter part of June last, and a question then arose touching the
jurisdiction of the judges of this court, or either of them, to act
upon such applications in vacation, and having declined to entertain jurisdiction in the matter, the application was renewed to the
court upon its convening at the present session. The same question, respecting applications for this and other writs of original ju- '
risdiction, has been frequently raised before us at chambers, and as
frequently ruled upon by the judges, but as no record is made of
such proceeding in vacation, no written opinion declaring such
ruling has ever been filed by the court, and hence, although this
question is not a material one in the determination of this application, since it is presented to the court, yet we deem it hot out of
place to pass upon the question here, in order that it may furnish
a referable guide hereafter.
The points, therefore to be passed upon in order are:
1st. May the judges of the Supreme Court, or either of them, entertain jurisdiction to hear and determine such matters in vacation ?
2d. Does the writ of habeas corpus lie as the proper remedy in
this case ?
3d. Ought the petitioner to t)e discharged or set at liberty upon
the state of facts presented ?
Upon the first question there is very little authority to guide in
reaching a conclusion, aside from the language of our state constitution bearing thereon.
Section 2 of Article vi. of the Constitution declares that, "The
Supreme Court, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
shall have appellate jurisdiction only." * * * And section 3, following, reads as follows: "It shall have power to issue writs of
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ha6eas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction and
other original and remedial writs, with authority to hear and determine the same."
This language confers jurisdiction, in respect 6f remedies under
the several 'writs enumerated, upon the court only, by express
terms, and not upon the judges thereof, and therefore if the judges
ppssess any such power it is by implication from the foregoing
language. That no such implication arises hias been uniformly
held by the judges of this court ever since the organization thereof
under the state constitution. This court, as expressed by the
language of the constitution above quoted, is constituted to be primarily and essentially a court of appellate jurisdiction. Constitutions are instruments of limitation, chiefly as to the powers thereby
conferred, and had it been the intent of the framers of our constitution to confer jurisdiction in respect of the writs mentioned, upon
the judges of this court to act singly and out of term, such intent,
as in the constitutions of many of the other states, should have
been clearly expressed.
* The question of most difficulty to be answered is, that, inasmuch as the legislature has by statutory provisions (sect. 1609
General Statutes) conferred this authority upon the judges, and
since the constitution does not expressly declare that the justices in
vacation shall not exercise this power, and that the legislature
retains all legitimate powers not expressly, forbidden, may it not
legally confer such power upon the justices ?
If this question be answered in the negative, as we think it
should be, it is chiefly because the enumeration by the constitution
of certain powers to be exercised by the court, and other linguage
contained in that instrument, by clear imputation, forbids the
exercise of such authority by the justices out of term.
In the case of Bx parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, under a statute giving the right to Justices of the Suprerhe Court of the
United States to issue the writ, but not to the court, it was held,
(JoHNSON, J., dissenting)i that the court might do so if in the exercise of its appellate powers, but that the converse of this proposition would legally follow, is far from conclusive. We incline to
think that the writ of habeas corpus, while ancient and existing .as
a common-law writ before its enactment as the statute of 31 Car.
II, is not now, issued by courts or judges except the power so to
do is expressly given by statute.
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And in the'case of Exparte Bollman, it is said by Chief Justice
that "Courts which originate in the common law, possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by common liw, until
some statute shall change their established principles; but courts
which are created by written law and whose jurisdiction is defined
by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction: * * * for the
meaning of the term habeas corpus resort may unquestionably be
had to the common law ; but the power to award the writ by the
courts of the United States must be given by written law." And,
considering the language of our own constitution touching this
question, and also the nature, objects and prime functions of our
Supreme Court,we conclude that the justices thereof, acting singly
or out of term, are without constitutional jurisdiction and authority
to issue the certain writs enumerated in the constitutional provision
referred to, or to hear or determine the matters arising thereon.
Second.-Is the proceeding by habeas corpus the proper remedy,
inthis case?
We think itis. The statute under which the remedy issought,
and the only one which affords such remedy, where one exists at
all, isthe Habeas Corpus At,and a substantially similar provision for accomplishing the same object-the securing to persons
charged with the higher class of crimes a speedy trial, according
to law-was contained in the English Habeas Corpus Act of
Charles II., and, with various modifications, has been brought
down to our time, as a part of the act providing for the issue of
this famous writ of right, for the protection of personal liberty.
In the case of Brooks v., The People, 88 Illinois 327, under
a similar statute, the question was presented by writ of error,
the statute in question having been taken out of the Habeas Corpus Act, and placed in the General Criminal Law; and so the
question whether habeas corpus would lie was not raised nor discussed, in the principal opinion; but, in the separate opinion of
Mr. Justice SCOTT, who dissented upon another ground, it is said
that habeas corpus lies, in such cases.
The case of the Commonwealth v. Adcock, 8 Grattan, cited by
the Attorney-General, we deem unnecessary to review. It is sufficient to say that it is unsafe to attempt to avoid the bard consequences of a particular case by setting up what the court or judga
may conceive to be the "spirit of the law" against the plain letter
and principles of the law.
MARSHALL
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The same remedy was pursued in the cases of Green v. Th7e
Commonwealth, 1 Rob. (Va.) 781, and in Glover's Case, 109 Mass.
840, and, upon principle, we think the writ in such cases ought to
lie, for if a given case is brought within the provisions of the act,
it becomes a case of an unlawful restraint of liberty. A few
authorities hold a contrary doctrine, but so far as I have examined, are cases arising upon statutes different from ours, such as
the case of Ex parte M Gehan, 22 Ohio St. 444, where the statute
provided for the absolute discharge of the prisoner from the offence,
and it was held that the judgment of the court below denying the
motion for such discharge was to be reviewed upon error, inasmuch
as said judgment was a final discharge, which in effect was an acquittal of the crime charged. Our statute, it will be noted, does
not work such discharge of the offence, but operates merely to set
the prisoner at liberty.
For the foregoing reasons we must hold that in the case at bar
the writ prayed is the proper remedy.
Third.-Ought the petitioner to be enlarged upon the facts presented ?
The answer to this question rests upon matters of fact solely,
for in a case brought fairly within its provisions the statute seems
to be peremptory. We are not compelled, upon this application,
to consider the proceedings in this case prior to the reversal upon
error by this court (6 Colo. 559), in May, 1883, of the judgment
of the District Court upon the conviction of murder. It appears
from the uncontradicted averments of the petition that when the
cause was then remanded to the District Court "for further
proceedings according to law," the April Term of that court was
still in session, and there can be no doubt as to that court's then
having jurisdiction to try the case. Instead of putting the petitioner upon trial for the crime of manslaughter, the court without
trial or verdict, pronoun.ced judgment against him and committed
him to the penitentiary for the term of eight years. This court,
upon habeas corpus, again interposed and discharged him from the
penitentiary, but remanded him to the custody of the sheriff to be
held for trial. In the meantime the September Term, 1883. and
the January Term, 1884, of said court, came and went, and at the
following April term, 1884, the petitioner interposed his motion
for discharge under the statute. Before the hearing upon this
motion the cause was transferred from the District Court upon its

BALT. & OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. ALLEN.

own motion to the Criminal Court of Arapaboe county. The
March term of this latter court was then in session, and upon a
hearing therein of petitioner's said motion it was denied, after
which the term adjourned without trying him.
It appears then from the record that there were four terms of
the District Court, to wit: April and September, 1883, and January and April, 1884, at each of which that court had jurisdiction
both of the petitioner and his offence, and there was in addition one
term of the Criminal Court, when this latter court possessed such
jurisdiction. At each of these five terms the petitioner might
have been tried; the failure to try did not happen upon his application and he has been in custody during tlbe entire time.
It seems to us, under this state of facts, that we must either
misconstrue the statute and legislate into it much that does not
appear therein, or grant the prayer of the petitioner ; and, forasmuch as the facts disclosed, as above recited, appear to bring the case clearly within the plain provisions of the statute upon which
this application is made, it becomes our duty, in administering the
law, to adjudge and order that the petitioner be set at liberty, and
it is so ordered accordingly.

United States Circuit Court, West. Dit. of Virginia.
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. ALLEN.
Rolling stock belonging to a corporation of one state and used upon roads leased
to it in another state is personal pioperty, and not taxable under general statutes of
the latter state imposing taxes on railroad property.

MOTION for injunction.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court which was
delivered by
PAUL, J.-The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, a corporation under the laws of the state of Maryland, has, for a
number of years, been the lessee of the following railroads in the
state of Virginia, incorporated by variotts acts of the Virginia
legislature, and owned by Virginia corporations, viz.: The Winchester and Potomac Railroad, the Winchester and Strasburg
Railroad and the Strasburg and Harrisonburg Railroad. the last
named being part of the old Manassas Gap Railroad. The said
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company also works or operates the
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Valley Railroad fr9m Harrisonburg to Staunton. None of these
railroads, so leased and operated by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, own any rolling stock, but the same is furnished
by the Baltimore and Ohio Company. The domicile or home office
of the Baltimore- and Ohio Railroad Company is in the city of
Baltimore, state of Maryland. Section 20, chapter 119, of Acts
of the Virginia Legislature, session 1881-2, prescribes the mode
of assessing railroads and canals for purposes of taxation, and the
following provision designates what property shall be taxed:
"Every railroad and canal company not exempted from taxation
by virtue of its charter, shall report annually on the first day of
June, to the auditor of public accounts, all of its real and personal
property of every description as of the first day of February of
each year, showing particularly in what county or corporation such
property is located, and cassifying the same under the following
heads: 1st. Roadway and track or canal bed. 2d. Depots, depot
grounds and lots, station buildings and fixtures and machine shops.
8d. Real estate not included in other classes. 4th.- Rolling stock,
including passenger, freights, cattle or stock, baggage, mail,
express, sleeping, palace and'all other cars, owned by or belonging
to the company; boats, machinery and equipments, houses and
appurtenances occupied by lock, gate keepers and other employees.
5th. Stores. 6th. Telegraph lines. 7th. Miscellaneous property."
The said railroad companies, the Winchester and Potomac, the
Winchester and Strasburg, the Strasburg and Harrisonburg, and the
Valley Railroad made their reports to the auditor of public accounts
as required, and were by the board of public works, duly assessed
on their roadways and tracks, depots and other real estate owned by
them. Their reports show that they were not the owners of any
rolling stock. On the-'day of June 1883, S.Brown Allen, auditor of public accounts for the state of Virginia, assessed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company with taxes on its rolling stock,
used on said roads, for the years from 1870 to 1881 inclusive, amounting in the aggregate for eleven years to the sum of $22,249.25, and
on the- day of June 1883 placed the said taxes in the hands of J.
Ed. Hamilton, treasurer of Augusta county, Virginia, for collection.
On the - day of June 1883 said Hamilton, treasurer, distrained certain property, such as engines, passenger cars, box cars, stock cars,
&c., belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and
n the refusal of said company to pay the taxes so levied for, adver-
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tised said property to be sold at public auction. To prevent this
sale a restraining order was, on the petition of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company awarded on the - day of June 1883, by the
judge of this circuit, inhibiting the said Hamilton, treasurer, from
making sale of said property. It is on a motion by the defendants,
S. Brown Allen, auditor, and others to dissolve this restraining order
that the court is called upon to decide the question as to the liability
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for the taxes levied
on its rolling stock employed by it in its operation of the aforesaid
railroads, leased by it in the state of Virginia.
The first question presented is, the character of the property on
which the tax is assessed. Is it realty or pdrsonalty, or does it fall
within the definition of movable fixtures ? The doctrine that the
engines, cars, &c., used in operating - railroad, are movable fixtures,
is not sustained by the current of authorities. It is in no sense
real property, or savoring of the realty. That it is personal property cannot be successfully controverted, and therefore as the subject
of taxation, it is governed by the same general rules applicable to
other personal property.
" The weight of authority is that it is personal estate to be taxed
to the road, where it has its domicile :" Burroughs onTaxation 186.
That;it may by the legislature, be treated as real estate is admitted:
that the legislature of Virginia has not so treated it is conceded.
That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is a foreign corporation is not disputed. We think that a careful reading of the
act of the Virginia legislature, chap. 119, Session Acts 1881-2,
shows that the tax to be imposed on the real and personal property
of railroads, is to be imposed on home railroads, those chartered
under the laws of Virginia.
Section 20, of the Act says: "Every Railroad Company and
('anal Company, not exempted from taxation, by virtue of its charter, shall report aunually," &c. The act means, "by virtue of its
charter," the provisions of a charter granted by the legisleture of
Virginia. The legislature of Virginia would have no right or power
to make such a provision as to a foreign corporation. A charter
granted a foreign corporation exempting it from taxation can only
avail it within the dominion of the sovereign granting the charter;
when it carries its property, into the dominions of another sovereign
it becomes subject to the tax laws of the latter.
The same clause of the section 20 referred to, requires the report
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to show particularly in what county or corporation such property
is locaWd. In the 22d section of the same act, providing for the
taxation of express, transportation, steamship, sleeping-car companies, &c., said companies are required to return the value of all
real and personal property owned by said company and persons
and located within said state (Virginia). And this view that
the statute does not contemplate the taxation of rolling stock not
located in this state, but only temporarily within her borders, having its situs or location in another state, gathers strength from the
fact that this is the construction given the statute by the predecessors
of Auditor Allen, and of the board of public works of which-he is
a member. The act was passed by the legislature during the session
of 1869-70, and no assessment of the rolling stock of the complainant, used in operating the railroads leased by it in Virginia,
has ever been made until that made by Auditor Allen on the - day
of June 1883. It has been said that if a statute "be susceptible
of the interpretation which has been put upon it, by long usage, the
courts will not disturb that construction." H. & N. 856.
The construction we have given the statute is in harmony with the
current of decisions, for the authorities are numerous and clear,
that, "a -c orporation is taxable for its personal property at its domicile, which is the state of its creation and within that state in the
town, where it has its principal office or place of business :" Burroughs on Taxation 186. Let us apply this principle to the facts
presented in this cause.
the evidence shows that the complainant, the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company, was chartered by the state of Maryland, that its
home or principal office, is in the city of Baltimore in that state,
and that said city is the head-qdarters for all of its rolling stock
used on its main and branch lines, that the trains are run solid from
Lexington, Virginia (formerly from Staunton), to Baltimore, Md
That none of its rolling stock is assigned permanently to service in
the state of Virginia, nor to the four roads operated by it in that
state. That its rolling stock is used interchangeably upon its
main line, and branches In the states of Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania and states west of the Ohio river, as the
necessities of the company may require.
In Orange and Alexandria Bailroad Company v. City Council
of Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 186, when this question arose, JoYNES, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Upon this state of facts
-
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I am of opinion that the railroad company must be considered as
having its residence or domicil at Alexandria, and that its rolling
stock, though in daily ise upon the road and absent from the city
the greater part of the time, is to be considered as belonging there
and is liable to taxation by the city.

The Phil., Wilming. & Balt. Railroad Co. v. Appeal Tax Court
of Baltimore City, 50 Md. 415-16, was the case of a foreign corporation doing business in Maryland with its principal office or place
of business in Philadelphia, though owning extensive leasehold
estates in the city of Baltimore and part of its line being chartered
under the laws of Maryland; the court said: "It is plain the rolling stock of the company cannot have permanent location or legal
8itus at two or more places at the same tithe, unless so declared by
positive statute, and conceding that it should be located at the domicile or home or principal office of the corporation, it is clear, as the
law now stands, there can be no well-founded claim to assess this
property in Baltimore. The engines and cars of the appellant have
no abiding place or permanent location in this state, so as to become
incorporated with the other permanent property of the state, and
are only brought here transiently while employed in the operations
of the road. And whether such engines and cars be regarded as
personal property, or as so far partaking of the nature of realty as
to justify the denomination of them as movable fixtures, the principle equally applies. They have the movable, quality, and in the
absence of positive legislation fixing a different situs, they can have
no other given them by construction, than the home or principal
office of the corporation."

See also The Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore ity v. The
.Northern Central Railway Co., 50 Md. 417.
Thie decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the

cases of Hayes v. The Pacific Hail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596,
and St. Louis v. The Ferry Company, 11 Wall. 425, rest upon facts
very similar to those presented in the cause before us. A leading case
on this question, the power to tax the rolling stock of a railroad
elsewhere than where it has its actual situs, is Pacifc -ailroad Co.,
v. Cass County et. el., 53 Mo. 31-32. The result of that decision
is that the rolling stock of a railroad company which is in a county
which is not the legal residence of the corporation, and which is
only in transit or temporarily there, is not taxable in the county
which is the legal residence of such corporation.

